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ABSTRACT 
 
The accession of the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the European 
Union has placed a legal obligation on them to relinquish their national currencies and adopt 
the euro. This dissertation applies the theory of optimum currency areas to evaluate the 
economic rationale of EMU membership for nine CEECs. OCA properties are embedded in a 
cost-benefit analytical framework and applied to the CEECs in order to comprehensively 
analyse the economic case for EMU membership. Due to evidence of the limited capacity for 
alternative adjustment channels to absorb the impact of asymmetric shocks, the cost side of 
the analysis focuses on the degree of business cycle correlation between the CEECs and the 
euro area. Applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to quarterly real GDP data between 1995 and 
2010, the tests find that despite considerable progress in convergence, the degree of 
correlation between the CEECs and the aggregate euro area business cycle is below what is 
observed among the existing EMU members. This indicates a substantial risk still exists that 
the ECB‟s monetary policy may be ill-configured to economic conditions in some CEECs. 
The benefit side of the analysis focuses on the degree of trade integration with the euro area. 
Hungary and the Czech Republic were found to be best-positioned of the CEECs to benefit 
from the elimination of transaction costs. The overall findings of the analysis suggest that 
EMU membership represents no additional cost to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, 
and that they should experience a net benefit from participation in the eurozone. By fixing 
their exchange rates to the euro, these countries have already relinquished monetary policy 
autonomy as indicated by the Impossible Trinity principle. Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania would be well-advised to wait until business cycles achieve 
closer correlation with the euro area core before proceeding with EMU accession. Three key 
policy recommendations are made to help minimise the costs of EMU participation. 
Structural reforms increasing the flexibility of labour markets are necessary to ensure 
unemployment does not bear the brunt of economic disturbances. Prudent fiscal policy is 
advised to ensure the sustainability of the public finances and to counteract the risk of 
economic overheating. Finally, tight financial sector supervision is encouraged to mitigate the 
risk that an anticipated fall in interest rates leads to asset price bubbles which could threaten 
the stability of the financial sector and the wider economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On 1 January 1999 eleven European Union Member States made the ultimate 
commitment to the process of European monetary integration by relinquishing their 
respective national currencies and adopting a single currency, the euro.
1
  Marking the third, 
and final, stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), from this date 
exchange rates between the eleven participating members were irrevocably fixed and 
sovereignty over national monetary policies transferred to a single monetary authority, the 
European Central Bank (ECB). By eliminating exchange rate uncertainty and transaction 
costs between participating members, policymakers expected that the adoption of the single 
currency would enhance microeconomic efficiency and growth through increased trade and 
heightened competition.
2
 The single currency was also viewed as an opportunity to improve 
price stability and encourage convergence between the union‟s constituent countries and 
regions.
3
 
The launch of the EMU was also a significant milestone within the broader process of 
European economic and political integration. Carefully mapped out in the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty,
4
 the realisation of the EMU was preceded by fifty years of deepening economic and 
political integration and marked the end of over three decades of attempts to achieve 
                                                 
1
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 
officially adopted the euro as their currency on 1 January 1999. Initially a unit of account, the euro currency was 
not introduced in cash form until 1 January 2002. 
2
 These were the main benefits identified by the 1990 „One Market, One Money‟ report commissioned by the 
then European Commission President Jacques Delors to determine the likely economic effects of a move to a 
European Economic and Monetary Union.  
3
 See European Commission (1990, p.9). 
4
 Formally known as the Treaty of European Union, it was signed by Foreign and Finance Ministers on 7 
February 1992 and ratified by all members by the end of 1993. With the exception of Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, which obtained certain opt-out clauses entitling them to decide their own monetary future, all 
remaining members committed to the adoption of the single currency. 
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monetary union in Europe.
5
 In that time, a number of arrangements attempting to limit 
exchange rate fluctuations between European currencies failed.
6
 Shortly after the official ban 
on capital controls from July 1990, there was a widely held view that a single currency was 
needed for the Single Market to exploit its full potential (Mongelli, 2008).  
Two episodes of European Union enlargement, in May 2004 and January 2007, have 
included ten former socialist countries in the process of European economic and political 
integration.
7
 In signing the Accession Treaty to become full members of the European Union, 
all countries are faced with a legal obligation to relinquish their national currencies and adopt 
the euro.
8
 To date, three of the former socialist countries (Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia) 
have fulfilled this obligation. The remaining seven (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) are legally obliged to create the conditions necessary 
to meet the convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty and adopt the euro as their 
official currency.
9
 However, while each country is legally required to create the conditions 
necessary to join the euro, there is no deadline to abrogate their derogation; the respective 
economic authorities retain the freedom to influence the pace of progress in their path 
towards full Eurozone membership (NBP, 2009). 
                                                 
5
 The 1962 Marjolin Memorandum proposing an economic and monetary union for the members of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) marks the official starting point of monetary integration in Europe 
(Mongelli, 2008). In the intervening period, the 1970 Werner Report planned to realise an economic and 
monetary union in Europe by 1980. 
6
 Part of the European Monetary System (EMS), the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was initiated in 1979 to 
limit exchange rate variability between participating members. Existing until its replacement with ERM-II on 1 
January 1999, the bands within which exchange rates were allowed to fluctuate around the European Currency 
Unit (ECU) came under increasing pressure following the ban on capital controls in 1990. In 1992 the UK was 
forced to abandon the ERM. After Italy followed suit, the bands were widened to +/-15% in March 1993 
(Mongelli, 2008). 
7
 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the European 
Union on 1 May 2004 along with Cyprus and Malta. Bulgaria and Romania became full EU members on 1 
January 2007. 
8
 As EU Member States, all acceding countries automatically participate in the third (i.e. definitive) stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union with the status of participant with derogation. With the exception of Denmark 
and the United Kingdom, which are not legally required to adopt the euro, all remaining non-eurozone EU 
members have the status of EMU participant with derogation. Denied an opt-out, Sweden is classified as an 
EMU participant with derogation. However, reluctant to adopt the euro, Sweden reached a gentleman‟s 
agreement with the European authorities whereby it would be de facto treated in the same manner as Denmark 
(Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2009). 
9
 In accordance with Articles 104 and 121 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), the 
achievement of durable nominal and legal convergence is a formal condition for the adoption of the single 
currency and the abrogation of a country‟s derogation. In addition to the legal convergence criteria, there are 
five economic convergence criteria (more commonly known as the Maastricht criteria). These are as follows: (i) 
the inflation rate should be no more than 1.5% higher than the average of the three lowest inflation rates of the 
existing Member States; (ii) interest rates (of government bonds or comparable securities) should not exceed by 
more than 2% the average observed in the three lowest-inflation countries; (iii) countries must have participated 
in the ERM and not experienced a devaluation for at least two years before entrance to the union; (iv) the 
government‟s general deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP; and (v) the ratio of government debt to GDP should 
not exceed 60%, or the ratio must be diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace 
(ECB, 2010). 
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The main aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the economic rationale of EMU 
membership for the seven Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) with derogation. 
Although each country is legally required to eventually transfer monetary policy sovereignty 
to the ECB, they have retained the freedom to decide when to do this. Two other CEECs will 
be included in this research. Estonia abrogated its derogation by becoming a full EMU 
member on 1 January 2011. As the empirical study employs data up to 31 December 2010, 
Estonia will be included in the research. Findings in the case of Estonia will provide a 
retrospective analysis of the economic justification for its accession. Additionally, Croatia 
completed accession negotiations with the EU and is expected to become an EU Member 
State on 1 July 2013.
10
 As Croatia will also be legally required to adopt the euro, an 
examination of the economic rationale for Croatian EMU membership is also important.
11
 
An evaluation of the economic rationale for EMU membership is warranted for a 
number of reasons. To the extent that independent monetary policy is useful as an instrument 
for maintaining internal and external balance in the economy, the relinquishment of 
sovereignty over the control of interest rates and money supply represents an economic cost 
to a country. As such, an assessment of the net welfare effects of EMU membership should 
be integral in the decision of when a country should join the euro. However, despite the 
critical significance of the choice of exchange rate regime to the welfare of a nation‟s 
economy, economic considerations play a minor role in the procedure for euro adoption.
12
 In 
his assessment of the process of designing the institutions and rules which would govern the 
EMU, Wyplosz (2006) confirms that such was the urgency in drafting the details of the 
EMU, there was no time for any detailed economic analysis.
13
  
In evaluating the economic rationale of full EMU membership for these countries, the 
results of the research will be useful in analysing whether the countries in question should 
prioritise efforts to adopt the euro, or whether they would benefit from postponing accession. 
Although the decision on the pace of progress towards EMU accession is ultimately a 
political one, an evaluation of the economic case for membership should be highly influential 
in guiding this decision. Economic crises in some peripheral eurozone Member States in 2010 
                                                 
10
 Accession negotiations were completed in June 2011 (European Commission, 2011). 
11
 All future EU countries will also be expected to join the EMU. See ECB (2008). 
12
 Rather than ensuring a country stands to benefit from participation in EMU, the Maastricht criteria focus on 
minimising the risk of destabilising exchange rate volatilities and misalignments that had on numerous 
occasions disrupted the EMS (Mongelli, 2008). 
13
 Sensing an opportunity after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the successful adoption of the Single Act, 
the single currency project was given such urgency that academic research could not keep up with the speed of 
decisions being made (Wyplosz, 2006).  
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and 2011 underline the need to ensure that there is a strong economic case for EMU 
accession and that adopting the euro will produce net benefits for acceding countries.
14
  
In order to achieve the aim of the dissertation, the analysis must be grounded in a 
strong theoretical framework. The theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) will provide the 
theoretical foundations for this research. Originating in the debate on the merits of fixed and 
floating exchange rate regimes, the theory proposes a number of economic characteristics 
(frequently referred to as OCA properties or OCA criteria) which should ideally be shared 
between regions when drawing the boundaries of an optimum currency area. In identifying 
the conditions necessary for countries to function well in a fixed exchange rate regime, the 
OCA theory provides a useful starting point for analysing the costs and benefits of monetary 
integration and forms the intellectual foundation for any discussion on currency unions 
(Horvath, 2003).  
The main contribution of this research is, however, an empirical one. By 
operationalising the OCA theory in the context of European monetary integration with the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), the research will provide policy 
recommendations for the pace at which these countries should proceed along the path to euro 
adoption. Applying the theory to a set of countries for which the prospect of monetary 
integration is a very real and pertinent issue, the research will shed light on whether the 
CEECs in question should prioritise efforts to satisfy the Maastricht criteria and proceed with 
euro adoption, or whether they would benefit from postponing eurozone accession to a later 
date.  
Unlike a number of studies which focus on just one of the OCA criteria, this research 
considers the wider OCA theory to provide an informed evaluation of the economic 
suitability of eurozone membership for the CEECs in question. By utilising the most recent 
data available to assess the situation as of 31 December 2010, this research also contributes to 
the empirical OCA literature by updating the findings of some previous comparable studies. 
The inclusion of data covering the recent financial crisis will add further value to the research 
by assessing whether the crisis has affected the economic rationale of EMU membership for 
the CEECs.  
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is appropriate to first highlight some 
limitations of the research. The obligation to join the EMU at some point demonstrates in 
                                                 
14
 In its annual report assessing the Czech Republic‟s economic alignment with the euro area, the Czech 
National Bank notes in 2010 that economic crises in the eurozone‟s periphery have consequences for ensuring 
the EMU accession will have real benefits for the Czech Republic (CNB, 2010). 
5 
 
itself that the composition of the EMU is not static. As new members join, the EMU changes 
and this may alter the balance of costs and benefits associated with membership as time 
progresses. In evaluating the rationale of EMU membership for the CEECs, the EMU is 
considered as it existed in December 2010 to simplify the analysis. This applies not only to 
the constituent members of the EMU, but also to the rules and institutions governing the 
EMU. Research conclusions will not extend to recommendations regarding the institutional 
and structural set-up of the EMU itself. 
In the chapter which follows, the OCA theoretical literature will be examined in order 
to establish an analytical framework for evaluating the economic rationale of EMU 
membership for the CEECs. The chapter will begin by describing the context in which the 
CEECs are faced with a decision regarding their exchange rate arrangement. Developments 
in the analytical approach of theory since the identification of the OCA properties will be 
examined before an appropriate analytical framework for the research is identified. 
Chapter two focuses on the empirical evidence generated in the OCA literature. In 
particular, attention will focus on studies which empirically apply the OCA theory to the case 
of monetary integration in Central and Eastern Europe. Close attention will be paid to the 
methods used and the conclusions with respect to the economic case of EMU membership for 
the CEECs. 
The OCA theory will be operationalised in chapter three to evaluate the economic 
case for EMU membership for the CEECs at the focus of this study. Results from the 
empirical tests will be analysed and the economic rationale of EMU membership will be 
evaluated. Conclusions will be provided in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY 
  
Since the identification of the optimum currency area concept by Mundell in his 
seminal 1961 paper „A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas‟, the OCA theory has reshaped 
the debate on the choice of exchange rate regime for a given country (Horvath, 2003). By 
identifying the economic characteristics desirable for the smooth functioning of a single 
currency area, the theory provides a theoretical foundation for evaluating the appropriateness 
of monetary integration for a given country. It therefore offers an appropriate theoretical 
grounding for this research in evaluating the economic rationale of EMU membership for the 
CEECs in question.  
The aim of this chapter is to define an analytical framework within which the 
economic rationale of eurozone membership for the CEECs in question can be assessed. 
Before examining the OCA theory in-depth, it is useful to first consider the context in which 
these countries are faced with the decision of choosing an exchange rate regime. In the 
section which follows, features of the Mundell-Fleming open economy model will be used to 
provide this context in the setting of European monetary integration. 
 
 
1.1: The Impossible Trinity: Contextualising the Choice of Exchange Rate 
Regime 
 
The Impossible Trinity principle (depicted in Figure 1 below) presents the 
relationship between the exchange rate regime, monetary policy sovereignty and capital 
mobility. Based on the Mundell-Fleming open economy model, it demonstrates the 
unviability of simultaneously maintaining free capital flows, a fixed exchange rate and a 
7 
 
sovereign monetary policy.
15
 Instead, it shows that it is feasible for a country‟s central bank 
to maintain just two of these three objectives represented at each vertex.  
Observing the global trend towards greater international capital mobility, countries 
are increasingly being pushed towards the lower part of the graph (Frankel, 1999). 
Essentially, increased global capital mobility is whittling the trilemma down into a dilemma: 
a choice between monetary policy autonomy and a fixed exchange rate regime. It is within 
this context that the debate on the merits of fixed versus floating exchange rates can be 
viewed.  
The depiction of the Impossibly Trinity principle can be somewhat misleading, 
however, as the options presented in it represent only two extreme possibilities in a spectrum 
of exchange rate arrangements. At one extreme, monetary union represents the ultimate 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate regime.
16
 At the other extreme, a pure floating 
arrangement, in which the central bank allows the forces of supply and demand determine the 
exchange rate by not interfering in the foreign exchange market, represents the most flexible 
arrangement possible. Frankel (1999, p.2) describes the fixed versus floating debate as an 
“oversimplified dichotomy”. In his view, intermediate exchange rate regimes are often more 
likely to be appropriate than the „corner solutions‟ of free float and currency union. Frankel 
(1999, p.37) states: “for many countries, regimes between the extremes of pure floating and 
rigid fixity will continue to be appropriate, the new conventional wisdom notwithstanding”.  
Frankel distinguishes seven intermediate exchange rate regimes between the two 
extremes (positioned at the bottom of Figure 1 in order of flexibility/rigidity
17
). These 
arrangements can be further grouped into three categories according to the International 
Monetary Fund‟s classification system: floating (free float and managed float); hard pegs 
(monetary union and currency board); and, in between the two, soft pegs (all other 
intermediate regimes).
18
 
 
                                                 
15
 See Wyplosz (1997). 
16
 By fully abandoning the national currency in a monetary union, there is no greater commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate regime. However, the dissolution of the Soviet rouble and the Czechoslovak koruna in 1993 
demonstrate that even a monetary union can become unfixed. 
17
 Beneath them, the current exchange rate regimes of the CEECs at the focus of this study correspond with the 
arrangement above. This classification is sourced from the official monetary policy strategies detailed in the 
European Central Bank‟s 2010 Annual Report (ECB, 2011) and from SEB‟s 2011 FX guide (SEB, 2011). 
18
 The IMF distinguishes a fourth, „Residual‟, category for other exchange rate arrangements, such as 
frequently-changing policies, which do not correspond to the three main groupings. See Habermeire, et al. 
(2009) for detailed descriptions of the IMF exchange rate regime classifications. 
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Figure 1: The Impossible Trinity
19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The new conventional wisdom to which Frankel refers is the so-called corner-solution 
hypothesis. Originally proposed by Eichengreen (1994), it suggests that the susceptibility of 
intermediate exchange rate regimes to speculative attacks in an environment of high 
international capital mobility will leave the corner solutions (i.e. floating or hard pegs) as the 
only viable options available to policymakers. Evidence from the literature supports 
Eichengreen‟s hypothesis. In his study of exchange rate regime options, Fischer (2001) 
confirms an observable trend away from intermediate exchange regimes, describing a 
„hollowing out of the middle‟ in a bipolar direction towards free floating and hard pegs 
(monetary unions and currency boards). He explains the observed desertion of intermediate 
                                                 
19
 Source: Frankel (1999). Amended by author. 
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exchange rate regimes by pointing out that intermediate, soft peg, arrangements have not 
proved viable for countries integrating into international capital markets. Fischer (2001) 
forecasts that the trend away from intermediate exchange rate regimes will continue and 
eventually lead to fewer independent national currencies. 
Hence, not only is the liberalisation of international capital markets pushing countries 
towards the bottom part of the graph, but also out to the sides, towards the polar options of 
monetary union and free floating exchange rate arrangements. Despite Frankel‟s enthusiasm 
for intermediate exchange rate regimes, therefore, countries are likely to find such 
arrangements increasingly difficult to maintain and be forced towards either monetary union 
at one extreme, or a free floating arrangement at the other. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, p.74) 
concur: “there is little, if any, comfortable middle ground between floating rates and the 
adoption of a common currency”.  
The Impossible Trinity principle and the corner solution hypothesis are relevant to the 
CEECs in this study and to the European monetary integration process more generally. The 
establishment of the EMU itself can be viewed as a corner solution to the challenges posed by 
the Impossible Trinity principle. Following the full liberalisation of capital movements within 
the EEC in July 1990, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), initiated in 1979 to limit 
exchange rate variability between participating members, came under increasing pressure. 
The unfeasibility of full capital mobility, independent monetary policies and limited 
exchange rate flexibility eventually led to a speculative attack which forced the UK to 
abandon the ERM on 16 September 1992.
20
 After Italy was forced to follow suit, the ERM 
bands were widened to ±15% in March 1993. Indeed, Fischer (2001) points out that fresh 
thinking about exchange rate regimes and the belief in the non-robustness of intermediate 
exchange rate regimes for countries integrating into global capital markets partly derives 
from the manner in which the ERM was attacked. 
Detailed in Table 1 below (and also in Figure 1), the choice of exchange rate regime 
by the Central and Eastern European countries at the focus of this study also reflects the trend 
observed by Fischer of the hollowing out of intermediate exchange rate regimes. At one 
extreme, Estonia has abandoned its national currency and entered monetary union with 
sixteen other European countries. Bulgaria and Lithuania, in employing a currency board 
arrangement with their currencies firmly fixed to the euro, also maintain a form of hard peg 
                                                 
20
 Commonly referred to as „Black Wednesday‟. 
10 
 
arrangement and, as a consequence, have effectively renounced sovereignty over monetary 
policy. 
At the other extreme, both Poland and Hungary are classified as having free floating 
currencies, allowing the forces of supply and demand to decide on the value of their 
currencies relative to others. Meanwhile, Romania, Croatia and the Czech Republic are 
classified as having a managed floating exchange rate regime, allowing authorities to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market but without announcing a commitment to any 
particular exchange rate. By not committing to a fixed exchange rate, these four countries 
have effectively maintained monetary policy autonomy. 
 
 
Table 1: CEEC Exchange Rate Regimes 
CEEC 
2010 GDP  
(€ millions)
21
  
Currency Exchange Rate Regime
22
 
Participation 
in ERM-II
23
 
Estonia 14,501 Euro 
EMU member. Currency board 
prior to 1 January 2011. 
28/06/2004 – 
31/12/2010 
Latvia 17,971 Latvian lat 
Managed floating exchange 
rate: €1 = LVL 0.702804 ± 1% 
02/05/2005 - 
present 
Lithuania 27,410 
Lithuanian 
litas 
Currency board arrangement: 
€1 = LTL 3.45280  
28/06/2004 - 
present 
Bulgaria 36,034 Bulgarian lev 
Currency board arrangement: 
€1 = BGN 1.95583  
N/A 
Croatia 45,899 Croatian kuna 
Managed floating exchange 
rate: no pre-announced band 
N/A 
Czech R. 98,446 Czech koruna 
Managed floating exchange 
rate: no pre-announced band 
N/A 
Romania 121,941 Romanian leu 
Managed floating exchange 
rate: no pre-announced band 
N/A 
Hungary 145,049 
Hungarian 
forint 
Free-floating exchange rate 
N/A 
Poland 354,316 Polish zloty Free-floating exchange rate 
N/A 
 
  
                                                 
21
 Source: Eurostat Database. 
22
 Source: ECB (2011), SEB (2011). 
23
 Source: ECB (2010). 
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Of the countries being studied here, only Latvia maintains a soft peg arrangement. By 
targeting a band of ±1% around a rate of 0.702804 lats to the euro, the authorities must 
intervene in the foreign exchange markets if the value of the lat threatens to move outside this 
band. A speculative attack on the currency in February 2007, at the beginning of the financial 
crisis, demonstrates most clearly the difficulties posed by intermediate exchange rate regimes 
in environments of high capital mobility.
24
 
Table 1 also contains details of CEECs‟ participation in the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM-II). Currencies participating in ERM-II are allowed to float within a range of ±15% 
around a central rate to the euro and participation for two years without devaluation is one of 
the Maastricht criteria for euro adoption. Currently, Latvia and Lithuania are the only two 
CEECs participating in the mechanism. The remaining non-euro members in CEE have yet to 
enter the mechanism, meaning that they will not be allowed to adopt the euro for at least two 
years.
25
  
The evidence presented here has demonstrated that the realities of the Impossible 
Trinity principle are influencing the CEECs‟ choice of exchange rate regime. Increasing 
levels of capital mobility in Europe are forcing CEECs to choose between monetary policy 
autonomy and exchange rate flexibility. The vulnerability of intermediate exchange rate 
regimes is pushing the smaller CEECs towards hard peg options (currency board and 
monetary union) while larger CEECs are choosing flexible exchange rate regimes, 
confirming the trend predicted under the corner-solution hypothesis.
26
 Now, however, all 
CEECs are faced with an obligation to abandon monetary policy autonomy and choose the 
monetary union corner solution as part of the wider process of European integration. In the 
sections which follow, the OCA theory will be examined to examine how the economic 
rationale for this move to the EMU can be evaluated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 See Anderson (2007) for details of the turmoil in the Latvian economy. 
25
 Buiter and Grafe (2002) argue that forcing prospective euro members to participate in „ERM purgatory‟ is a 
pointless and costly exercise which exposes these countries to the unavoidable risk of speculative attacks. 
26
 The relative size of the economies considered as measured by 2010 GDP in Table 1 illustrate that the smaller 
CEEC economies (the Baltics and Bulgaria) have opted for fixed exchange rate regimes while the larger CEECs 
have chosen to maintain exchange rate flexibility. 
12 
 
1.2 Early OCA Theory 
 
The theory of optimum currency areas has its origins in the debate on the optimal 
exchange rate regime, and more specifically on the merits of fixed versus floating exchange 
rate regimes (Ishiyama, 1975). It was from this discussion that Mundell (1961) defined the 
optimum currency area problem as the determination of the geographic domain in which the 
goals of internal balance (low inflation and full employment) and external balance 
(sustainable balance of payments position) can most easily be achieved (Dellas and Tavlas, 
2009, p.1123). A key feature of the theory is the identification of characteristics (frequently 
referred to as OCA properties, or OCA criteria), which, when shared by countries or regions, 
will facilitate the maintenance of internal and external balance in the absence of flexible 
exchange rates.  
 
 
1.2.1: Mundell Vs. Friedman and the Fixed Vs. Floating Debate 
 
Despite Mundell being accredited with the title of founding father of OCA theory, 
Cesarano (2006) points out that, at a theoretical level, he was presaged by Friedman in 
identifying the conditions necessary for the smooth functioning of a currency union. In his 
1953 paper „The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates‟, Friedman argued that if internal prices 
and wages in an economy were as flexible as exchange rates, there would be no difference in 
how the external balance of payments would be achieved. However, recognising the reality of 
sticky internal prices, and especially wages, Friedman highlights the adjustment problems 
created by a system of fixed exchange rates. In such a system, the rigidities posed by the 
stickiness of internal prices will result in unemployment as part of the adjustment process to 
an external deficit. To the extent that price rigidities inhibit the adjustment process and 
produce unemployment, Friedman argued that a flexible exchange rate is the more efficient 
method for adjusting to external change.
27
 
Mundell‟s celebrated (1961) paper „A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas‟ appears 
to have been partly aimed at contesting Friedman‟s argument in favour of flexible exchange 
rate regimes (Cesarano, 2006). Mundell‟s approach differed fundamentally from that of 
Friedman. Rather than focusing on identifying the conditions which necessitate flexible 
exchange rates, Mundell aimed to identify the economic characteristics which would 
                                                 
27
 See Friedman (1953, pp. 161 -167). 
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diminish the economic costs of relinquishing nominal exchange rate flexibility and 
nationally-tailored monetary policy. By identifying the optimum currency area problem as the 
determination of a geographical area within which external and internal balance can most 
easily be achieved, Mundell challenged the presumption that the borders of currency areas 
should coincide with those of sovereign states: “Today, if the case for flexible exchange rates 
is a strong one, it is, in logic, a case for flexible exchange rates based on regional currencies, 
not on national ones. The optimum currency area is the region” (Mundell, 1961, p.660). 
Mundell uses the example of a permanent shift in demand to demonstrate the effects 
of an asymmetric shock to one region, West, which is in a currency union with another 
region, East. The example demonstrates the adjustment difficulties faced by both regions 
sharing the same currency in the absence of factor mobility. One major outcome of the paper 
is that factor mobility between countries or regions contemplating the formation of a 
monetary union is a necessary prerequisite if the costs of relinquishing monetary policy 
autonomy are to be minimised. Mundell (1961, p.664) concludes that “if labour and capital 
are insufficiently mobile within a country then flexibility of the external price of the national 
currency cannot be expected to perform the stabilization function attributed to it, and one 
could expect varying rates of unemployment or inflation in the different regions”.  
In demonstrating that the characteristics of a region, or country, should be considered 
in determining the optimal exchange rate regime, Mundell had reshaped the debate on the 
pros and cons of fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes and laid the foundations for the 
theory of optimum currency areas. Prior to this, participants in the debate paid little attention 
to differences between countries, leaving the impression that the principles of the debate 
could be applied to all countries irrespective of their economic characteristics (Ishiyama, 
1975; Kawai, 1992).  
 
 
1.2.2: The Pioneering OCA Properties 
 
Two OCA properties emerge from the Friedman-Mundell debate: flexibility of prices 
and wages, and mobility of factors of production. In a single currency area, these properties 
will facilitate adjustment to an economic shock, providing an alternative adjustment channel 
to the nominal exchange rate in the event of an asymmetric shock. The identification of the 
OCA problem by Mundell generated further contributions from academics interested in 
identifying the conditions necessary for the smooth functioning of a single currency area. 
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McKinnon (1963) introduces the openness of an economy to trade as an additional 
economic characteristic in the assessment of the optimality of a currency area. Distinguishing 
between the production of tradable and non-tradable goods in an economy, McKinnon 
proposes a model which examines the effect of changes in the relative prices of tradable and 
non-tradable goods on an economy‟s overall price level. The model demonstrates how, in a 
relatively-open economy, the transmission of changes in the international price of tradables to 
the general price index reduces the effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate as an 
adjustment instrument. The finding implies that relatively open economies should fix their 
exchange rates. It also follows that open economies that trade extensively with one another 
may find it optimal to form a monetary union. Another OCA property which can be derived 
from McKinnon‟s paper is the size of an economy. Given that small economies are likely to 
be relatively more open to trade, the transmission of changes in international prices is likely 
to reduce the usefulness of the nominal exchange rate and independent monetary policy as 
tools for economic adjustment. 
Kenen (1969) turns attention to exploring the determinants of asymmetric shocks in 
identifying the desirable economic properties of a single currency area. He proposes that 
highly diversified economies are better-suited to the formation of a common currency area as 
they are more insulated from sector-specific shocks than are less-diversified economies. 
Furthermore, economies with similar production structures should encounter a smaller cost in 
forming a common currency area because sector-specific shocks are likely to affect them 
symmetrically.  
Kenen (1969), too, develops the concept of the degree of fiscal integration as a 
property of optimum currency areas. He highlights how fiscal transfers between participants 
in a single currency area can serve to smooth the effects of asymmetric shocks by transferring 
funds to regions of high unemployment from regions unaffected by a shock. As such, a 
system of fiscal transfers can act as an alternative adjustment mechanism in the absence of 
flexible exchange rates, mobility of the factors of production or flexibility of prices and 
wages. 
A number of other OCA properties have been proposed in the pioneering approach to 
OCA theory. Ingram (1962) highlights how financial market integration could cushion the 
effects of asymmetric shocks in a fixed exchange rate regime through capital flows. Financial 
market integration would allow for equilibrating capital movements between regions affected 
by idiosyncratic shocks. De Grauwe (2009) describes this as a private insurance scheme 
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against asymmetric shocks.
28
 Similarities in inflation rates is an OCA property proposed by 
Fleming (1971), who notes that similarities in inflation rates over time help maintain stable 
terms of trade. Finally, some authors emphasise the political aspect of monetary integration in 
analysing the optimum currency area. Mintz (1970), for example, identifies political will as 
the most important condition in forming a monetary union. Table 2 below summarises the 
OCA properties that emerged from the pioneering approach to OCA theory. 
 
 
Table 2: The Pioneering OCA Properties29 
 OCA Properties Proponent 
1. Price and Wage Flexibility Friedman (1953) 
2. Mobility of Factors of Production Mundell (1961) 
3. Openness and Size of Economy McKinnon (1963) 
4. Diversification of Production and Consumption Kenen (1969) 
5. Fiscal Integration Kenen (1969) 
6. Financial Market Integration Ingram (1962) 
7. Political Integration Mintz (1970) 
8. Similarities in Inflation Rates Fleming (1971) 
 
 
The early OCA theory provided an innovative approach to the discussion of the 
optimal exchange rate regime. However, the prohibitively difficult nature of its initial aim led 
to the low operational precision of the OCA theory (Horvath and Komárek, 2002). 
Additionally, the OCA properties were mired in inconsistencies and contradictions. For 
example, according to the theory, a small open economy should consider forming a currency 
union with a major trading partner. Yet, given that the production structures of small 
economies tend, by their nature, to be less diversified, the theory also suggests that that 
economy would find it optimal to operate a flexible exchange rate regime.
30
 
                                                 
28
 Similarly, the public scheme against asymmetric shocks is the equivalent of fiscal transfers proposed in 
Kenen‟s (1969) fiscal integration OCA property. See De Grauwe (2009, pp. 10-13) 
29
 See Mongelli (2005, pp. 608-611) 
30
 This is one of a number of contradictions raised by the OCA theory identified by Dellas and Tavlas (2009, p. 
1126). 
16 
 
Ishiyama (1975) was a prominent contributor in redefining the OCA theory. In his 
review of the early literature on optimum currency area theory, he highlights the limitations 
of the analytical framework in which authors attempted to single out a single crucial 
economic characteristic to determine the boundaries of an OCA. Recognising the inherent 
weaknesses in the OCA framework which had been emerging, Ishiyama proposes evaluating 
the costs and benefits of forming a currency union as an alternative approach to determining 
the domain of an OCA. According to Ishiyama‟s „alternative approach‟, “the optimum 
currency area is defined at the margin by the balance between the costs and benefits of 
having a common currency” (Ishiyama, 1975, p.345). 
Ishiyama‟s contribution helped provide more structure to the interpretation of OCA 
properties, which were used to address more systematically than before the relative costs and 
benefits of monetary integration (Mongelli, 2002). Despite developments in the analytical 
approach to the OCA theory, however, a mechanism did not exist for resolving the continued 
contradictions and inconsistencies among the OCA properties. Due to the persistent 
limitations of the analytical framework, OCA theory was consigned to „intellectual limbo‟ for 
much of the 1970s and 1980s (Tavlas, 1993).  
 
 
1.3: The “New” OCA Theory 
  
A revival of interest in the subject did not occur until the late 1980s. Reinvigoration of 
the process of European monetary integration, developments in macroeconomic theory and 
advancements in econometric techniques all contributed to the re-found popularity of the 
subject (Tavlas, 1993; Mongelli, 2005). Renewed interest in OCA theory also saw a change 
of course in the fundamental purpose of the theory. Rather than seeking to draw the 
boundaries of optimal currency areas based on regional economic characteristics, the OCA 
properties were now used to provide a theoretical basis for discussing the costs and benefits 
of monetary integration.   
Developments in macroeconomic theory led to a reassessment of the effective costs 
and benefits of sharing a single currency. A „new‟ OCA theory began to emerge using the 
earlier approach as a point of departure, which stressed the criteria and methodology in 
choosing a single currency and enumerated the costs and benefits of a single currency 
(Tavlas, 1993). As a result of the reassessment, the balance of judgements shifted in favour of 
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monetary unions; greater emphasis is now placed on the benefits of monetary unions while 
fewer costs are seen to be generated from the adoption of a single currency (Mongelli, 2005). 
 
 
1.3.1: Costs of Monetary Union 
 
Since the debate on the pros and cons of fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes, 
the usefulness of monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate as adjustment tools in the 
event of an economic disturbance have been central to the OCA literature. Indeed, most of 
the OCA properties proposed in the early approach to OCA theory sought to identify 
characteristics which would either provide alternative channels for adjustment, or reduce the 
likelihood of an asymmetric shock occurring in the first place, i.e. seeking ways to diminish 
the costs associated with relinquishment of monetary policy autonomy. It is not surprising, 
then, that in the new cost-benefit approach to OCA theory, loss of monetary policy autonomy 
is viewed as the primary cost associated with the adoption of a single currency. The 
magnitude of the loss associated with the relinquishment of monetary policy autonomy has, 
however, changed since the 1970s. 
Corden (1972) was one of the first to emphasise the primary cost associated with 
monetary union as the loss of control over national monetary policy to choose the desired mix 
between inflation and unemployment point along the long-run Phillips Curve. At that time, it 
was assumed that monetary authorities had the power to manipulate aggregate demand to 
offset supply and demand shocks; it was believed that it was possible to attain a desired point 
along the long-run Phillips curve in a permanent trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment.  
Buiter (1999, p.49) refers to this belief that monetary policy can be used 
systematically and effectively to dampen the effect on the real economy of internal and 
external shocks as the “fine tuning fallacy”. Under what is referred to as the „monetarist 
critique‟, the belief that the monetary authorities are free to choose a point along the long-run 
Phillips curve is now considered invalid (Tavlas, 1993). Rather, the long-run Phillips curve 
has been replaced with the Natural Rate of Unemployment (NRU), leaving policymakers free 
to choose only the rate of inflation in the long-run. Artis (1991, p.316) states: “the 
displacement of the Phillips curve by the “natural rate of unemployment” as the place to 
start analysis is going to mean that the only benefit of floating exchange rates is the ability to 
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choose a different rate of inflation from other countries - and we now see little reason to want 
to choose a positive rate of inflation”. 
The monetarist critique of the long-run Phillips curve has highlighted the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy in the long-run. Due to this revision, the primary cost 
associated with monetary union (the loss of independent monetary policy) has been scaled 
down in the new approach to OCA theory (Mongelli, 2005). It should be noted, however, that 
although the cost associated with the relinquishment of sovereign monetary policy has 
declined in the long-run, it is still considered to be useful in the adjustment process to short-
term, temporary disturbances in the economy. 
Considering the new approach of the OCA theory, Mongelli (2002, p.25) identifies a 
new OCA „meta property‟ for evaluating the potential costs of participation in monetary 
union: “The similarity of shocks, and policy responses to shocks, is almost a “catch all” 
OCA property, or “meta” property, capturing the interaction between several properties”. 
The underlying intuition behind this proposal is that if shocks affecting participant members 
in a monetary union are similar, and the pace of adjustment to them are similar, then the 
single monetary policy governing them will be suitable for all members. The need for 
monetary policy autonomy will be reduced, diminishing the economic cost of relinquishing 
monetary policy sovereignty. As Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, p.194) state: “Only if 
disturbances are distributed asymmetrically across countries will there be occasion for an 
asymmetric policy response and the constraints of monetary union may then be felt”.  
 
 
1.3.2: Benefits of Monetary Union 
 
The reassessment of the OCA theory has tended to downplay the costs associated with 
monetary union, while the benefits arising from participation in a single currency area have 
received more attention. While the costs of a common currency are mostly associated with 
the macroeconomic management of the economy, many of the benefits are situated at the 
microeconomic level (De Grauwe, 2009). 
The most obvious direct benefits from participation in a monetary union derive from 
the elimination of transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty. Sharing a common 
currency, cross-border transactions within a monetary union will no longer require the 
exchange of one currency for another. The European Commission (1990, p.21) estimate the 
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savings from the elimination of transaction costs at between €13 billion and €19 billion per 
year, or 0.5% of the EEC GDP annually. It adds that this saving could reach 1% of GDP for 
Member States with small open economies and weak currencies which are not widely used 
internationally.  
To the extent that transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty represent 
impediments to trade and cross-border investment, their elimination can also be expected to 
have significant trade creation effects and promote long-term cross-border investments. 
Elimination of transaction costs also has the indirect effect of increasing price transparency 
between participating members, which can, in turn, increase competition throughout the 
monetary union. Combined with the effect of a reduction in exchange rate risk premia, these 
may lead to greater microeconomic efficiency with attendant effects on overall growth 
(European Commission, 1990).  
In another reinterpretation of the costs and benefits associated within monetary union, 
one recent discussion has focused on the potential benefits of improved monetary policy 
credibility for countries forming a currency union. The discussion has its roots in the time-
consistency literature developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon 
(1983), which highlight how economic agents follow optimal strategies in response to the 
strategies of the authorities. It points to a game between the government and the private 
sector in which economic agents understand that the policy makers have every reason to 
promise low inflation, while also having incentives to renege on that promise in the event that 
economic agents accept the assertion at face value. The upshot of this is that governments 
with a reputation for pursuing inflationary policies will find it extremely difficult to shed that 
reputation (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988).  
One way of shedding the high-inflation reputation and gaining low-inflation 
credibility is to renounce sovereignty of monetary policy completely by forming a monetary 
union (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989). However, the existence of an anchor country which 
recognises the costs of high inflation, has built a reputation for the maintenance of low 
inflation, and which will not alter its commitment to low inflation after the formation of the 
monetary union is vital if countries wish to gain low-inflation credibility in this way (Rogoff, 
1985; Goodhart, 1990). In this way, monetary union offers the potential to import monetary 
policy credibility from an anchor country. This discussion also transforms the similarity of 
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inflation rates from a desirable property
31
 of prospective monetary union members to a 
desirable outcome for participants in monetary union (Tavlas, 1993). 
 
 
1.4: Endogeneity of the OCA Properties 
  
Until the late 1990s, the analytical framework developed in the OCA literature for 
evaluating the suitability of monetary union was static in nature. The OCA properties were 
analysed using backward-looking information to assess whether countries were suitable 
candidates for monetary union before integrating, i.e. ex-ante. However, the application of 
the Lucas Critique to the OCA theory since the late 1990s has again reshaped the debate on 
the optimality of single currency areas.
32
 As a result, much of the recent work in the OCA 
literature has focused on how monetary integration may change economic structure, possibly 
strengthening suitability for monetary union ex-post (Dellas and Tavlas, 2009, p.1132).  
Initiated by Frankel and Rose‟s (1998) influential paper „The Endogeneity of the 
Optimum Currency Area Criteria‟, this new insight into the dynamic nature of the OCA 
properties has profoundly altered the way in which the OCA properties are viewed. Frankel 
and Rose (1998, p.1011) state: “The suitability of European countries for EMU cannot be 
judged on the basis of historical data since the structure of these economies is likely to 
change dramatically as a result of EMU”. Two relationships are central to their hypothesis of 
the endogeneity of the OCA properties.  
The first relationship relates to the trade creation effects of monetary union: it is 
hypothesised that participation in a monetary union will encourage deeper trade integration 
among participating members. The second relationship relates to the effects of trade intensity 
on business cycle correlation: it is hypothesised that countries that trade intensely with one 
another will be subjected to similar economic shocks. 
The theoretical foundations of the argument that the formation of a monetary union 
can boost trade intensity lie in the expectation that it reduces barriers to trade between 
members of a currency union through the elimination of transaction costs and exchange rate 
risk. However, up until 1998 there was considerable scepticism among economists as to the 
trade-boosting effect of a reduction in exchange rate variability (Frankel, 2008a). In addition 
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 As suggested by Fleming (1971). 
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 Lucas (1976) drew attention to the fact that changes in economic policy can lead to changes in economic 
structure, complicating the ex-ante interpretation of economic policies based on ex-post data. 
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to the lack of empirical evidence of the trade effects of monetary union, the theoretical 
backing for this scepticism lay in the belief that exporters and importers could use forwards 
and futures markets to hedge exchange rate uncertainty.
33
   
The question here, though, relates not only to the effects of exchange rate volatility on 
trade, but to the trade effects caused by the formation of a monetary union. After all, any 
proposed trade benefits resulting from the fixing of exchange rates may also be attained 
through the implementation of a currency board or fixed peg exchange rate regime. As has 
been mentioned in section 1.1, monetary union is the firmest possible commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate regime and is therefore less likely to be subject to a speculative attack. In the 
sense that membership of a monetary union precludes future devaluations, monetary unions 
can facilitate foreign direct investment (FDI) and the building of long-term relations above 
and beyond what a currency board might (De Grauwe and Mongelli, 2005). Furthermore, 
formation of a monetary union may signal a readiness to participate in broader economic 
integration including on issues regarding labour policy and property rights (Engel and 
Rogers, 2004). 
A number of studies had already hinted at the potential trade integration effects of the 
adoption of a common currency at the time of Frankel and Rose‟s paper. McCallum (1995) 
demonstrates empirically that despite very low barriers to trade between the USA and 
Canada, trade between Canadian provinces is twenty-two times higher than trade between 
Canadian provinces and American states. Engel and Rogers (1996) support McCallum‟s 
findings, that despite the relative openness of the USA-Canada border, crossing it still has the 
effect on price dispersion of adding 1,780 miles to the distance between cities. From these 
findings, Frankel and Rose (1998) predict that even if a fraction of the difference between 
international and intranational trade is due to a common currency, EMU could have a 
substantial effect on intra-European trade.  
The positive link between trade intensity and business cycle correlation is the second 
relationship at the centre of Frankel and Rose‟s hypothesis. Frankel and Rose (1998) 
hypothesise that the correlation of business cycles across countries depends on trade 
integration. If it is true, then, that increased trade integration as a result of monetary union 
leads to increased synchronisation in business cycles, the occurrence of asymmetric shocks to 
participating countries can be expected to decline after entering into monetary union. The 
significance of the hypothesis is that the reduced probability of asymmetric shocks (which 
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 Faults with the theoretical argument that exchange rate risk can be hedged lie in the presence of hedging costs 
and the lack of long-term hedging possibilities in most countries (Frankel, 2008a, p.3). 
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reduces the need for autonomous use of monetary policy) renders countries more suitable for 
participation in monetary union.  
The theoretical underpinnings of the hypothesis that increased trade integration leads 
to increased business cycle correlation lie in the assumption that bilateral trade links foster 
the transmission of business cycles between countries. If these trade links intensify, countries 
in monetary union are more exposed to the business cycles of their trading partners which 
influence their own business cycle, leading to increased synchronisation. The hypothesis 
proposed by Frankel and Rose implicitly suggests that this trade is dominated by intra-
industry trade (Artis, Fidrmuc and Scharler, 2008). If intra-industry trade dominates the 
increase in trade intensity between participating countries in a monetary union, a trade 
structure will emerge in which countries export and import similar categories of products. 
Shocks which are industry-specific can then be expected to have similar effects across 
countries (De Grauwe, 2009). 
The second, and opposing, view on the link between trade integration and business 
cycle correlation is based on standard trade theory and has been pioneered by Paul Krugman. 
According to Krugman‟s view, increased trade integration as a result of the formation of 
currency union will lead to increased concentration of industrial activities as increased 
economies of scale induce specialisation. Krugman (1993) contrasts the regional distribution 
of auto production in the USA and Europe, illustrating how distribution of production in the 
USA, which is more highly integrated than the EU, is much more concentrated than in the 
Europe. Krugman postulates that the increased economies of scale which result in the decline 
in trading costs within a currency union will result in increased concentration of industrial 
activities in regions which possess an advantage over other regions. As a result, production 
structures should be expected to become less diversified. If increased concentration of 
industrial production materialises after the formation of a currency union, industry-specific 
shocks can be expected to be more country-specific, thus increasing incidence of 
idiosyncratic shocks which would necessitate autonomous monetary policy for economic 
stabilisation. Krugman‟s view implies that by becoming more specialised in their production 
structures, countries which form a monetary union may become less suitable for membership 
after forming the union than they were before.  
 Considering both sides of the argument, there is a theoretical presumption in favour of 
the Frankel and Rose hypothesis that economic integration will make asymmetric shocks 
between countries less likely (De Grauwe, 2009). De Grauwe (2009) highlights two 
weaknesses in Krugman‟s hypothesis. Firstly, he points out that while economic integration 
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can increase concentration of industrial activities, those economic clusters will be more likely 
to transgress national borders, reducing the likelihood of industry-specific shocks become 
country-specific. The second weakness in Krugmen‟s argument lies in the fact that it focuses 
on the manufacturing sector. The declining importance of manufacturing in industrialised 
countries and the growth of services (which are less prone to geographical concentration) 
suggest that the specialisation hypothesis may no longer be robust.
34
 
 
 
1.5: Applying the OCA Theory to the EMU Question 
 
 The aim set out at the beginning of this chapter was to define an analytical framework 
for evaluating the economic rationale of EMU membership for the CEECs at the centre of 
this study. Following a contextualisation of the nature of the exchange rate regime choice 
facing the CEECs, developments in the OCA theory were examined. Central to the OCA 
literature, the notion that a country‟s characteristics should determine its choice of exchange 
rate regime has reshaped the debate on the choice of exchange rate regime for a given country 
(Horvath, 2003). A number of OCA properties were identified in the early OCA literature 
which, when shared between countries, would facilitate the smooth functioning of a common 
currency area.  
Inconsistencies and weaknesses in the early analytical framework, however, led to the 
low operational precision of the theory. Subsequent developments led to the emergence of a 
new OCA theory in which more structure was added to the interpretation of the OCA 
properties. The OCA theory has now developed to become the theoretical basis and standard 
point of departure for discussions on the costs and benefits of monetary integration for a 
given country (Bofinger, 1994; Horvath, 2003). Despite advancements in the theory, 
however, a comprehensive ready-to-use analytical framework for evaluating the economic 
rationale of monetary union membership does not exist.  
In order to evaluate the economic rationale of EMU membership for the CEECs, the 
approach taken in this study will be to embed the OCA properties in a cost-benefit analytical 
framework. OCA properties will be empirically applied to the CEECs in order to evaluate the 
relative magnitude of the main costs and benefits associated with EMU membership 
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 An OECD (2000) report concludes that after years of increasing concentration of economic activities in the 
USA, activity has begun to become more dispersed. Clark and Van Wincoop (2001) also produce evidence that 
the degree of specialisation in the USA is decreasing. 
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identified in the literature. The results will determine the economic rationale of EMU 
membership for countries involved. 
The main cost associated with monetary union membership identified in the literature 
is the loss of monetary policy autonomy. The Impossible Trinity principle was used earlier to 
demonstrate the incompatibility of maintaining monetary policy autonomy in monetary union 
in an environment of high capital mobility. Accordingly, accession to the EMU will entail the 
complete loss of monetary policy autonomy for CEECs; the national currency will cease to 
exist and control over all monetary policy instruments will be transferred to the European 
Central Bank. Controlling the monetary policy of the entire EMU, the ECB will set policy 
according to the economic conditions in the union as a whole. To the extent that nationally-
tailored monetary policy was effective in adjusting the economy to shocks and restoring 
internal and external balance, loss of monetary policy autonomy represents an economic cost 
to a country. 
It was demonstrated in section 1.1 that, by fixing their exchange rates to the euro, 
Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria have effectively renounced their monetary policy autonomy. 
Latvia has also severely restricted its ability to operate monetary policy independently of the 
euro area by allowing its currency to fluctuate within a very narrow band. With regard to the 
main cost associated with EMU membership, then, these countries have already accepted the 
main cost associated with participation in a monetary union. 
 The OCA literature has produced an OCA property which allows us to gauge to what 
extent the loss of monetary policy autonomy will be costly for a country. Considered the 
„meta‟ or „catch-all property‟ by Mongelli (2002), similarity of shocks and policy responses 
to those shocks offers a method for measuring the extent of this loss to an economy. For, if a 
country is subjected to the same shocks as other participating countries in a monetary union, 
and the speed with which the economies adjust to those shocks are similar, then the monetary 
policy set by the single central bank will suit that country‟s economic conditions and the cost 
associated with the loss of nationally-tailored monetary policy will diminish. It is only in the 
event of an asymmetric shock that the need for an asymmetric policy response will arise. 
 In the event that shocks between participating members in a monetary union are 
dissimilar, economic imbalances may materialise. Without nationally-tailored monetary 
policy to resolve internal imbalances (unemployment or inflation) and external imbalances 
(unsustainable balance of payments position) alternative adjustment mechanisms may replace 
the role previously played by monetary policy. Three OCA properties can be identified 
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which, when present, may replace the role played by monetary policy as a mechanism for 
facilitating adjustment to asymmetric shocks. 
 The first two can be traced back to the contributions of Friedman (1953) and Mundell 
(1961): price and wage flexibility and mobility of factors of production. Friedman 
demonstrated that if wages and prices were as flexible as the exchange rate, there would be 
no difference in how the external balance of payments would be achieved. Mundell, 
meanwhile, showed how mobility of capital and labour could relieve internal imbalances in 
the event of an asymmetric shock by shifting factors of production from low-demand to high-
demand regions.
35
 If satisfied, price and wage flexibility and mobility of the factors of 
production can offer an alternative adjustment mechanism to monetary policy and reduce the 
costs of monetary union membership. 
 Finally, a fiscal transfer mechanism which acts to transfer funds from regions 
characterised by buoyant economies, with excess demand and threat of inflation, to depressed 
regions, with excessive unemployment, may act to smooth asymmetric shocks in the absence 
of other adjustment channels. Kenen (1969) proposed some degree of fiscal integration as 
desirable for participants in a monetary union. Such a system would mitigate the potential 
costs associated with monetary union. 
 Potential costs arising from monetary union need to be weighed up and compared 
with the expected benefits. Turning to the benefit side, direct savings from the eradication of 
transaction costs and exchange rate risk represent the most significant direct benefits to a 
country forming a monetary union. To the extent that transaction costs and exchange rate 
uncertainty represent barriers to trade and investment, their elimination may well have an 
attendant trade-boosting effect as well as potential gains from heightened competition and 
microeconomic efficiency leading to higher overall growth. 
 The extent to which an economy is set to benefit from the elimination of transaction 
costs and exchange rate risk can be gauged by another OCA property: openness to trade. 
Countries in which trade with foreign countries constitutes a larger share of the economy are 
set to benefit more from the elimination of transaction costs and exchange rate risk compared 
with countries which are relatively closed to trade. This indicates that the welfare gain per 
capita from monetary union is greater for countries which are more open to trade compared 
with countries which are relatively closed (De Grauwe, 2009). A more specific measure of 
the extent to which a country will benefit from these factors is its degree of trade integration 
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 Considering the costs of migration, however, labour mobility is a plausible alternative mechanism mainly for 
adjusting in the long-term to permanent shocks (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993).  
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with other participating members in the monetary union as transaction costs and exchange 
rate risk will still apply to trade with countries outside the monetary union. 
 Openness of an economy to trade serves a dual purpose in this analysis. Not only does 
it gauge the extent to which a country will benefit from monetary union, but it is also an 
indicator of cost of losing monetary policy autonomy. McKinnon (1963) showed that the 
transmission of changes in international prices of tradables to the general price index reduces 
the effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment instrument for countries 
which are very open to trade. In this sense, openness to trade is a desirable property for 
potential monetary union participants both from a cost and a benefit viewpoint. 
 A second benefit which EMU membership may offer the CEECs is improved 
monetary policy credibility. In the reassessment of the OCA theory, it was shown that greater 
emphasis has been placed on the potential benefits of monetary union including the prospect 
of improved low-inflation credibility. This could also be a factor affecting the balance of 
judgements for countries considering monetary union.    
 A final consideration should be made in evaluating the economic rationale for EMU 
membership. The previous section drew attention to a recent strand of the OCA literature 
which hypothesises that the OCA properties may be endogenous in nature. In particular, the 
discussion focused on similarity of shocks and openness to trade as two OCA criteria which, 
if not fulfilled prior to monetary union membership, may be fulfilled after membership due to 
the structural changes which an economy is likely to undergo as a result of participating in 
the monetary union. If the theory can be relied upon, a case may be made in favour of EMU 
membership regardless of the current fulfilment of the OCA criteria. Figure 2 below 
graphically demonstrates the OCA properties to be examined in this analytical framework.  
 
Figure 2: Analytical Framework 
 
Costs of Monetary Union:  
1. Similarity of shocks and responses to shocks 
2. Flexibility of wages and prices 
3. Mobility of factors of production 
4. Fiscal transfer mechanism 
  
Benefits of Monetary Union: 
1.  Openness to trade/trade integration 
2. Scope for credibiltiy gains 
 
 
 
Endogeneity of the OCA properties? 
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CHAPTER TWO: CEECS AND THE EMU: THE EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
 
 Sudden momentum towards EMU and advancements in econometric techniques 
contributed to the renewed interest in OCA theory in the early 1990s and prompted a swathe 
of empirical literature applying the theory to analyse the suitability of monetary integration 
for various countries. Having established a theoretical framework for analysing the economic 
rationale of EMU membership, the aim of this chapter is to examine evidence from the 
empirical literature applying the OCA properties to the CEECs under examination. 
Three categories of empirical studies will be reviewed. Firstly, comprehensive in-
depth analytical studies applying multiple OCA properties to analyse the suitability of EMU 
membership for the CEECS will be reviewed. The focus of attention here will be on how the 
studies approach the question of EMU membership for the CEECs and the evidence they use 
in arriving at their conclusions. 
Secondly, literature focusing on the degree of business cycle correlation will be 
examined. Identified as the OCA meta property in the previous section, interest in empirically 
appllying this OCA property has been particularly high. The purpose here is to determine 
whether business cycles of the CEECs are sufficiently correlated with the euro area for the 
costs associated with the loss of monetary policy autonomy to be minimised. Close attention 
will be paid to the methods used for measuring the degree of business cycle correlation in 
anticipation of an operationalisation of this criterion in the following chapter. 
Finally, empirical evidence of the endogeneity theory based on the experience from 
EMU will be analysed. Having shown in the previous chapter the theoretical presumption in 
favour of the endogeneity theory, the aim here is to assess the actual extent to which 
endogeneity of the OCA properties have been detected in the EMU. Empirical evidence here 
will indicate how much the CEECs can depend on the endogeneity of the OCA properties in 
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their move towards the euro. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the implications 
of the empirical evidence for the current research agenda. 
 
 
2.1: Comprehensive Empirical Studies 
 
Artis (2003) points out that among the countries for which EMU was an option, only 
the UK, Sweden and Finland have made any use of the OCA criteria at an official level. The 
use of the OCA properties at an official level in the CEECs for analysing the economic 
rationale of EMU membership appears to be similarly limited.
36
 In what follows, 
comprehensive analytical reports from the IMF, Czech National Bank and the National Bank 
of Poland will be examined for evidence of how the OCA properties have been applied to the 
CEECs and what conclusions they come to regarding the economic rationale for EMU 
membership. 
 
2.1.1: International Monetary Fund Report 
 
 Schadler, et al. (2005) provide an in-depth analysis of the issue of euro adoption for 
five Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). 
The justification for excluding Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the study was based on the 
view that the Baltics do not face the same kind of challenges as the Central European 
countries (CECs) in their bid for euro adoption due to their „far closer policy links to the euro 
area‟.37 The authors‟ framework for deciding on the suitability and timing of euro adoption is 
based on three steps: analysis of the long-term costs and benefits of euro adoption; scrutiny of 
the policy and institutional changes necessary for successful participation in the EMU; and 
assessment of the timing for credibly and efficiently fulfilling the Maastricht criteria. 
The study draws heavily on the OCA literature in analysing the costs and benefits of 
euro adoption and the institutional and policy requirements for the successful participation of 
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 Apart from the official publications from the Czech National Bank and the National Bank of Poland reviewed 
here, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2002), an occasional paper from the Hungarian Central Bank, appears to be the 
only other comprehensive application of the OCA theory at an official level among the CEECs examined. The 
study is not reviewed here in detail because the evidence used in the report is over nine years old. The report 
concludes that the euro area is at least as optimal a currency area for Hungary as it is for less developed euro 
area countries. 
37
 That is, unlike the CECs, they have already relinquished or restricted monetary policy autonomy through their 
choice of fixed exchange rate regimes. 
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the CECs in EMU, using evidence from existing empirical studies in formulating 
conclusions. From the beginning, the authors identify a group of „non-core‟ countries within 
the EMU (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Finland and Ireland) which had low levels of 
inflation, fiscal or business cycle convergence when joining. They are used as a benchmark in 
the analysis from which they draw lessons for the CEC countries preparing for adoption.   
Regarding the potential benefits of euro adoption, trade creation and the attendant 
effects on income are the focus. Early estimates of the likely gains in terms of trade and 
growth are described as „startlingly large‟.38 However, even based on later lower estimates of 
the potential trade creation effects of euro membership, the authors believe the flexibility of 
the CEC economies means they can expect to gain more than average in terms of trade 
creation.
 39
  Concerning the translation of benefits into GDP growth, the authors consider as 
reasonable the Magyar Nemzeti Bank‟s (2002) estimate that the euro will increase annual 
GDP growth by 0.6-0.8% over twenty years.
40
 
The cost of relinquishing monetary policy as a stabilisation tool in the event of an 
asymmetric shock is identified as the primary potential cost of euro adoption for the CECs: 
“Susceptibility and adaptability to asymmetric shocks remain the gold standards for judging 
the appropriateness of membership in a currency union” (Schadler, et al., 2005, p.19). 
With regard to the measurement of the susceptibility and adaptability to asymmetric 
shocks, the authors identify and review evidence of three methods: direct correlation of 
shocks;
41
 correlation of growth rates of economic activity;
42
 and, measures of the structural 
features of the economies which make them prone to asymmetric shocks or asymmetric 
responses to symmetric shocks. Based on their review of the empirical evidence, the authors 
find that the correlation of shocks between the CECs and the euro area is low, even compared 
with non-core euro area members, but observe that there is a trend of increasing correlation.  
Regarding adaptability to asymmetric shocks after euro adoption, the authors predict 
that countries will depend primarily on wage and price flexibility and the ability to employ a 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy as the two key alternative adjustment tools. An examination of 
the responsiveness of the real unit labour costs to unemployment between 1995 and 2002 
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 Referring, in part, to the finding of Rose (2000) that membership of a currency union could triple trade with 
other currency union members. 
39
 Faruquee (2004) finds a 10% increase in trade based on the first five years of EMU. 
40
 This estimate is based on the assumption that income will increase by one-third of the increase in trade/GDP. 
See Frankel and Rose (2002) for a detailed examination of the expected effects of a common currency on trade 
and income. 
41
 This method involves the distinction between supply and demand shocks to an economy. Further details of 
this approach will be discussed in the following section. 
42
 Capturing both asymmetric shocks and asymmetric responses to symmetric shocks. 
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finds responsiveness in the CECs to be similar to that of the euro area.
43
 Since no quantifiable 
standards exist, nominal wage flexibility (required to ensure unemployment does not shoulder 
the brunt of adverse shocks) is gauged indirectly through a number of indicators including 
employment protection legislation, the nature of the wage bargaining process and the 
presence of legally binding minimum wages.
44
  It is concluded that CEC labour markets are 
at least as flexible as those in the euro area. 
 While wage and price flexibility will be particularly useful for adapting to asymmetric 
shocks in the medium- to long-term, the authors emphasise the importance of the use of 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies to smoothing the short-term effects of asymmetric shocks in 
currency unions. Preparedness to actively use fiscal policies to restrain demand in the event 
of credit booms is stressed as especially important in monetary union. The authors highlight 
how the 3% deficit limit imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact restricts the use of fiscal 
policies as a stabilisation mechanism to negative shocks. A prudent overall debt burden of no 
more than 40-50% of GDP is encouraged by the authors when entering the EMU to take into 
account the possibility of more volatile demand and output in comparison with the euro area 
average. 
 A prudent government debt burden is the first of five key requirements the authors 
deem necessary for the successful participation of the CECs in the EMU. The second relates 
to the other alternative adjustment mechanisms: it is strongly recommended that wage and 
price flexibility is protected and strengthened where necessary prior to EMU accession so as 
to avoid excessive unemployment and loss of competitiveness in the absence of flexible 
exchange rates. 
 The third requirement identified by the authors is the strong synchronisation of 
economic activity with the euro area before accession to the EMU to ensure the monetary 
policy of the ECB will be appropriate for the cyclical conditions in the CECs. Measuring both 
the susceptibility to asymmetric shocks and the asymmetric response to symmetric shocks, 
the level of synchronisation between the CECs and the euro area was found to vary. While 
Hungary and Slovenia were found to be as highly synchronised as some of the core and non-
core euro area countries, synchronisation among all countries was observed to be increasing. 
 The importance of strong financial market supervision is identified as the fourth 
requirement for successful participation in the EMU. The authors expect rapid growth in 
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 The authors use annual data between 1995 and 2002 to calculate a wage curve equation following 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). See Schadler, et al. (2005, p.24) for more details. 
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 See Schader, et al. (2005, p.23) 
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credit to the private sector as a result of an expected decline in interest rates to pose a severe 
risk to economic stability. Effective banking supervision and fiscal constraint are considered 
imperative to avoid the possibility of economic overheating and asset price bubbles in the 
absence of monetary policy autonomy. Finally, the fifth requirement is that the conversion 
rate agreed should be considered carefully before accession to the EMU as downward price 
and wage rigidities could make adjustment to an overvalued accession exchange rate costly in 
terms of unemployment and economic growth. 
The authors conclude that according to historical data, the CECs examined are at least 
as well-suited to EMU membership as some of the non-core euro members. They expect that 
euro adoption will hasten real convergence with the euro area, although it is conceded that 
there exists a modest risk of increased economic volatility. On balance, it is concluded that 
euro adoption is likely to “bestow substantial net gains on the CECs over the long term and 
make them stronger, more self-reliant members of the EU” (Schadler, et al., 2005, p.10). 
 
 
2.1.2: National Bank of Poland Report 
 
 In 2009 the National Bank of Poland (NBP, 2009) published a report with the aim of 
conducting an in-depth analysis of the costs and benefits associated with Poland‟s adoption of 
the euro. While the analysis focuses on Poland‟s position, the 392-page report makes frequent 
references and comparisons to other CEECs and existing euro area members. The analysis 
considers Poland‟s degree of nominal and real convergence with the euro area before 
separately analysing the benefits and opportunities of euro adoption. The report also 
considers the costs and threats posed by euro adoption and the efficiency of shock 
accommodation mechanisms. Again, the report makes frequent references to the OCA theory 
and OCA properties. 
 With regards benefits, the authors identify the expected reduction in nominal interest 
rates as a result of a reduced exchange rate risk premium as the most important direct benefit 
to Poland from euro adoption. The authors estimate the quantity of this effect to be between 
2.3% and 2.4% in the long-run.
45
 Regarding long-term benefits, investment growth, trade 
intensification and increased competition effects as a result of euro adoption are viewed as 
most important. The attendant effects on GDP in the long-run as a result of replacing the 
                                                 
45
 The authors use the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) method in their calculations.  
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zloty with the euro are estimated at 7.5%, the majority of which will accrue in the decade 
following adoption. The authors translate this effect to 0.7% higher GDP growth per annum 
than if Poland were to remain outside the euro area. The authors warn, however, that Polish 
enterprises must be flexible enough to be able to absorb innovations and operate within an 
environment of heightened competition the full benefits are to be realised.  
 On the cost side, the report recognises the risk that the insufficient business cycle 
correlation between Poland and the euro area may result in an unsuitable ECB monetary 
policy for Polish economic conditions. It also considers the declining usefulness of 
independent monetary policy in an increasingly globalised economic environment. 
Reviewing the literature of business cycle correlation, the authors comment on the ambiguity 
of some of the results, but accept that the Polish business cycle appears to be more 
synchronised with the euro area than the average CEEC. Later, the report quantifies the 
estimated cost of the loss of monetary policy autonomy as equal to a 0.055% reduction in 
consumption, insignificant compared to the scale of the benefits estimated in the report.
46
  As 
well as being a shock absorber, the report points out that the floating zloty exchange rate has 
also been a source of shocks. This finding has the effect of diminishing the cost associated 
with the loss of the flexible exchange rate instrument. Concerning medium-term threats, the 
report highlights the importance of the government and Polish central bank using the tools 
available to ensure the expected increase in lending as a result of expected lower interest rates 
does not adversely affect asset prices and overall financial stability. 
 The report emphasises the enhanced importance of three alternative stabilisation 
mechanisms in the absence of nationally-tailored monetary policy: fiscal, real exchange rate 
and financial channels. According to the report, a reduction in the structural fiscal deficit to at 
least 1% of GDP is what is required if automatic stabilisers are to operate freely. The report 
found the structural deficit in Poland to be 2.5% in 2007 with an expected negative trend 
observed. The report highlights the high importance of ensuring a budget structure which 
would not result in an uncontrolled increase in the deficit in the event of a downturn. In 
particular, a low proportion of fixed expenditure is desirable so as to ensure the efficiency of 
discretionary expenditure in reacting to shocks. Figure 3 below demonstrates the proportion 
of fixed and discretionary expenditure in European fiscal budgets in 2007. Broadly speaking, 
each of the eight CEECs perform well compared to the existing euro area members. 
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(Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model). 
33 
 
Figure 3: Structure of Budget Expenditure in the EU-27 (2007)
47
  
 
 
 
 Influenced mainly by the efficient functioning of the markets for labour, goods and 
services, the real exchange rate (or competitiveness) channel is the second alternative 
adjustment channel emphasised by the report. The authors contrast the fortunes of countries 
deemed to have an efficient real exchange rate channel (Germany, Austria and Finland) with 
Portugal, deemed to have an inefficient real exchange rate channel, to emphasise the 
importance of flexible wages and prices. While the former group of countries maintained 
competitiveness in EMU by ensuring moderate wage and price increases, Portugal‟s faster 
growing prices and wages resulted in a loss of competitiveness which heralded economic 
stagnation in light of downward nominal rigidities.  
The report notes difficulty in evaluating the flexibility of the Polish labour market. 
While it finds wages in Poland to be relatively flexible compared with other European 
countries, it also notes a weak relationship between wage levels and the condition of the 
labour market. With regards the overall functional mobility and flexibility of labour, the 
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report finds the labour market takes a long time to absorb shocks, blaming institutional 
rigidities including a high tax wedge, aspects of the system of social benefits and low 
expenditure on active labour market policies. The report encourages prospective euro 
members to take heed from the experience of countries such as Portugal to ensure as much as 
possible the reform of labour markets prior to EMU accession to ensure the efficient 
functioning of the real exchange rate channel. 
 Concerning the third mechanism identified in the report, the financial channel is 
judged to have a limited capacity to absorb economic disturbances. This is attributed to the 
relatively low degree of financial market development in Poland, although it is noted that 
euro adoption may accelerate financial market development and financial integration with the 
euro area, potentially increasing the efficiency of the financial channel as an absorption 
mechanism. 
In its conclusion, the report predicts an asymmetry in the timing of costs and benefits 
arising from euro adoption. While the benefits already mentioned are expected to accrue over 
the medium- to long-term, there is a greater risk that the potential costs associated with euro 
adoption will materialise in the short-term. In order to avert these potential costs arising, the 
report emphasises the importance of implementing structural reforms to improve the 
efficiency of the alternative adjustment channels prior to euro adoption. Finally, in a 
supplement analysing the implications of the financial crisis on Poland‟s integration with the 
euro area, the report finds that the crisis does not affect the balance of costs and benefits 
concerning Poland‟s adoption of the euro. It is noted, however, that the crisis may seriously 
affect Poland‟s ability to meet the convergence criteria, particularly in relation to the fiscal 
criteria.  
 
 
2.1.3: Czech National Bank Report 
 
 In accordance with the Czech Republic‟s Euro-area Accession Strategy, the Czech 
National Bank (CNB) is required to publish, on an annual basis, an updated analytical 
document assessing the Czech Republic‟s economic alignment with the euro area. Entitled 
„Analyses of the Czech Republic‟s Current Economic Alignment with the Euro Area‟, the 
most recent such document was published in 2010 and compares the position of the Czech 
Republic with a number of euro area countries (Austria, Germany, Portugal, Slovakia and 
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Slovenia) and non-euro area countries (Hungary and Poland).
48
 The theory of optimum 
currency areas provides the theoretical foundations for the analysis and is summarised briefly 
at the beginning of the document. The main empirical analysis is divided into two sections. 
The first concerns the structural and cyclical alignments of the Czech Republic and 
comparable countries with the euro area. The second focuses on adjustment mechanisms.  
 The report‟s authors find a significant rise in the correlation of both overall economic 
activity and of individual supply shocks between the Czech Republic and the euro area. 
Overall, correlation of quarterly output between 2002Q1 and 2010Q1 with the euro area are 
judged to be reasonably high.
49
 However, they sound a strong note of caution that the sudden 
rise in correlation is as a result of the global economic downturn and suggest that the increase 
may not be indicative of future developments.  
 The high degree of openness of the Czech economy in terms of trade and ownership 
links with the euro area is one of the most positive indicators in favour of euro adoption for 
the Czech Republic, the report notes. The importance of this indicator is highlighted, both 
because it gauges the potential benefits in terms of the elimination of exchange rate risk and 
transaction costs in trade with other union members,
50
 and because the integration of an 
economy to economic relations decreases the effectiveness of independent monetary policy 
and diminishes the probability of asymmetric shocks.
51
 The openness of the economy is 
measured by the value of exports and imports with the euro area as a percentage of GDP. 
Concerning exports, Czech Republic exports more as a percentage of GDP (almost 70%) than 
any other country studied. The other countries studied display a similar degree of openness, 
although Germany exports considerably less (about 42% of GDP). The situation regarding 
imports is broadly similar. 
 The second section of the report focuses on alternative adjustment mechanisms 
including fiscal policy, wage elasticity, labour market flexibility and the shock-absorbing 
capacity of the banking sector. These are all areas where the report‟s authors identify either 
long-term problems or recent adverse developments. 
 Low by European standards, Czech government debt, at around 40% in 2010, was 
found to be similar to other CEECs. However, the authors point out that the markedly 
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 Calculations are based on quarter-on-quarter differences of real GDP. A method based on year-on-year 
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deteriorating public finance deficit could jeopardise this position and restrict the future ability 
of the government to employ fiscal policy as an alternative adjustment mechanism. Of the 
CEECs, only Hungary, with a government debt of almost 80%, could be compared with the 
western European countries studied which generally had higher public debts than the CEECs. 
The authors sound a note of caution that unsustainable public finances in monetary union, 
potentially creating the inability to finance future deficits and refinance maturing debt, may 
force countries into making drastic consolidation measures similar to that of Greece. 
 The authors measure real wage elasticity using a simple Philips curve and found 
evidence of low and decreasing elasticity of wages among the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia and Austria.
52
 Of all the countries studied, just Hungary was found to have 
significantly flexible real wages. Their findings suggest that wage elasticity cannot be relied 
upon as an alternative adjustment mechanism and that a low response of wages to labour 
demand may result in higher unemployment in most of the countries studied. Turning to 
labour market flexibility, the authors find considerable rigidities in the Czech labour market 
caused by the configuration of taxes and benefits and labour legislation which lead to low 
incentives to work among part of the population.  
 Although the annual CNB reports provide in-depth analyses and examinations of the 
various indicators it considers important in anticipation of euro adoption, they fall short of 
combining their findings to provide a conclusive view as to whether any of the countries 
studied should pursue with euro adoption or postpone. In its 2010 report, however, the CNB 
pays special attention to the fiscal crises in the euro area and their implications for euro 
adoption in the Czech Republic. It notes (p.18): “it will be necessary to consider whether the 
area we are to enter is in a suitable condition (not only economically, but also institutionally 
and politically) to ensure that euro adoption will be of real benefit to the Czech Republic”.   
 
 
2.2: Business Cycle Correlation between the CEECs and the Euro Area 
 
 
Following the revival of interest in OCA theory in the 1990s, a second wave of 
interest in OCA analyses was generated when it became clear that the CEECs would be 
obliged to participate in the EMU. Identified as the „catch-all‟ OCA property in chapter one, 
similarity of shocks and policy responses to those shocks has featured prominently in the 
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empirical literature for assessing the potential costs of monetary union. For, if countries are 
subjected to similar shocks, and adjust at a similar pace to those shocks, then the single 
monetary policy should be well-configured to the economic conditions of participating 
members. Only in the event of an asymmetric shock, or an asymmetric response to a 
symmetric shock, will an asymmetric policy response be necessitated and the constraints of 
monetary union felt.  
The empirical literature has operationalised this OCA property by examining the 
degree of business cycle correlation between countries contemplating participation in a 
monetary union. The announcement that the CEECs would be required to join the EMU led 
to an explosion in the numbers of studies analysing the degree of business cycle correlation 
between the CEECs and the euro area (Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006). In this section, the 
various methodological approaches and results will be examined from the business cycle 
correlation literature with a focus on studies examining the degree of correlation between the 
CEECs and the euro area. 
 
 
2.2.1: Econometric Approaches 
 
A common consensus has yet to emerge in the literature on the most appropriate 
method to empirically examine business cycle correlation between countries. Three distinct 
methodologies can be identified in the literature which has developed to examine the 
correlation of euro area and CEEC business cycles (Ben Arfa, 2009).  
 In the first category, a simple correlation of an indicator of output (most often GDP or 
industrial production) and inflation are tested. Although examinations using simple 
correlations prevailed in the early research of business cycle synchronisation, its short-
comings mean that it is no longer a prominent feature of the current research agenda 
(Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006). Despite this, a number of papers employing more advanced 
methods frequently begin with an analysis of the raw data including simple correlations.
53
 
Caution is needed in the interpretation of such tests, however, as the simple correlation of 
output growth and inflation data does not necessarily translate into synchronisation of 
business cycle (Mikek, 2009).  
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In the second approach identified, studies employ a technique in which time-series 
data for an indicator of aggregate output is de-trended to extract the cyclical component from 
the trend.
54
 The cyclical component is then tested for correlation between countries and 
analysed from the perspective of the international transmission of business cycles (Fidrmuc 
and Korhonen, 2006). If the cyclical component of two countries‟ aggregate output is highly 
correlated, incidence of an asymmetric shock is less likely. If their cyclical components were 
found to be uncorrelated, there is a strong likelihood that their economies will be subject to 
asymmetric shocks; a common monetary policy could create difficulties for both economies. 
The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and the Band-Pass (BP) filter are the two most 
popular filters in business cycle correlation literature (Darvas and Szapáry, 2008).
55
 Although 
there is no consensus on which is the most effective, the choice of filter can have a significant 
impact on the results. In his examination of a set of real US macroeconomic time series, 
Canova (1998) demonstrates the variation of results produced by a number of de-trending 
filters, finding that both quantitatively and qualitatively stylized facts of the US business 
cycles studied vary widely across de-trending methods.
56
 Having considered these findings, 
De Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008) conclude that despite the extraction of different 
types of information by the filters, the findings are similar when comparing the information 
across countries.  
The correlation of supply and demand shocks between countries is central to the final 
approach reviewed here. Studies following this approach employ a technique developed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) to recover underlying supply and demand shocks using time-
series output and inflation data. The technique was first operationalised in an OCA context by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). 
 At the centre of this approach is the distinction between the effects of supply and 
demand shocks on an economy. Demand and supply shocks can be recovered with the 
restriction that demand shocks have no impact on output in the long-term. Conversely, supply 
shocks do have a long-term impact on output. Applying this restriction in a structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR), it is possible to identify a country‟s supply and demand shocks. The 
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incidence of supply and demand shocks can then be tested for correlation between countries 
or regions.
57
 
 
   
2.2.2: Empirical Evidence from the CEECs 
 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006) provide a thorough and valuable analysis of thirty-five 
identified publications which focus on the degree of business cycle correlation between the 
CEECs and the euro area published up to 2005. The authors note the broad cross-country 
focus as a decisive feature of the literature, with studies often incorporating at least eight 
CEECs. Of them, they point out to that Bulgaria and Romania have received by far the least 
attention among the studies reviewed. The fact that few contributions to the research have 
come from CEEC central banks is highlighted by the authors. 
The authors identify significant data issues in the studies. The short period for which 
data are available and the quality of data available for the CEECs in particular in the early 
1990s calls the reliability of earlier empirical studies into question.
58
 The transformational 
recession experienced by the majority of CEECs following the collapse of the USSR 
compounds this problem and makes interpretation of pre-1995 output shocks problematic as 
they are associated with losses as a result of a change in economic system. For this reason, 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006) exclude any studies utilising pre-1995 data in their meta-
analysis of the business cycle correlation literature.  
Although two major categories of papers on business cycle correlation between the 
CEECs and the euro area are identified in the study (papers using a de-trended indicator of 
aggregate output, and papers using structural VARs), the SVAR method is judged to 
dominate the research agenda. The range of methodologies and sample periods used are 
found, however, to cause a lack of consensus as to the actual degree of business cycle 
correlation between the CEECs and the euro area.  
The authors find that overall, the Hungarian business cycle is found to be the most 
closely-correlated with the euro area of all the CEECs. Poland and Slovenia are also found to 
have relatively highly-synchronised business cycles with the euro area. Indeed, the level of 
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 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) also designate the over-identifying restriction that the accumulated effect of 
supply shocks on prices is negative while the accumulated effect of demand shocks on prices is positive. This is 
not employed in the SVAR model itself, but is useful as a method of testing the consistency of the results. 
58
 See, also, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003). 
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synchronisation of all three countries is found to exceed that of euro peripheral countries 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland in the majority of cases. Lithuania is the only country found to 
be negatively correlated with the euro area on average. 
Another feature of the literature reviewed by the authors is the frequent inclusion of at 
least one of the smaller peripheral euro area countries. According to the authors, these small 
peripheral euro member countries can be used as a gauge against which CEEC countries can 
be compared; if the level of correlation exceeds that of the EMU periphery, the new EU 
member may have achieved sufficient synchronisation so as to be deemed as having fulfilled 
this OCA: “These results imply that, even though the degree of correlation in the new 
member countries is not perfect, they could still be expected to manage reasonably well 
within the monetary union and be at least on par with Greece, Ireland or Portugal” (Fidrmuc 
and Korhonen, 2006, p.530). 
In one of the more recent empirical analyses of business cycle correlation in the 
enlarged EU, Darvas and Szapáry (2008) are highly critical of the popularity of the SVAR 
method employed to examine the correlation of demand and supply shocks. Two empirical 
issues are highlighted. Firstly, the long-run restriction applied in the SVAR model to recover 
supply and demand shocks from output and inflation data are deemed not make sense in the 
short period for which data is available for the CEECs. Secondly, identifying supply and 
demand shocks using inflation data is judged to be problematic in CEECs due to the changes 
in relative prices following trade and price liberalisation in the 1990s.  
Because of the deficiencies identified in the SVAR model, Darvas and Szapáry (2008) 
examine business cycle correlation in the enlarged EU using de-trended (using both the 
Hodrick-Prescott and Band-Pass filters) time-series data of GDP, private consumption, 
investments, exports, imports, industrial production and services. Seasonally adjusted 
quarterly data from eight CEECs
59
, ten EMU members
60
 and eight other countries
61
 for four 
non-overlapping five-year periods between 1983 and 2002 are studied
62
. Synchronisation of 
the business cycles of the countries listed with the business cycle of the euro area
63
 is tested.
64
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 Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
60
 Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal.  
61
 Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, United States, Japan and Russia. 
62
 Data for some countries, most notably the CEECs, was not available for the entire period under consideration. 
63
 The authors use two measures of euro area economic activity: euro area aggregate economic activity 
calculated by the ECB, and an aggregate of five countries (France, Germany, Italy, Austria and the Netherlands) 
calculated by the authors. 
64
 For robustness, the authors use five measures to examine synchronisation: contemporaneous unconditional 
correlation; lead/lag for which unconditional correlation is largest; volatility of cycles; persistence of series; and 
impulse response. 
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The main findings of the study are that, by 2002, the synchronisation of GDP, 
industrial production and services of Hungary, Poland and Slovenia had increased 
dramatically to approach the levels of the EMU core and exceed the levels of some EMU 
periphery countries. The output of Slovakia and the Czech Republic were found to become 
less synchronised from 1993 to 2002. The authors suggest that the currency crises in the two 
countries (in 1997 and 1998), and the recession which followed, may be the reasons for this 
finding. Finally, the three Baltic countries are found not to be synchronised with the euro area 
in either period examined and no trend towards increased correlation is observed. The 
countries‟ synchronisation with the Russian business cycle between 1993 and 1997, the 
impact of the 1998 Russian crisis, and the countries‟ close trade links with non-EMU Nordic 
countries are put forward as possible explanations for this finding. 
Mikek (2009) conducts one of the most recent studies employing the SVAR 
methodology developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989). The author uses quarterly data from 
1995Q1 to 2005Q4
65
 to study business cycle synchronisation between eight CEECs
66
 and the 
three largest „old‟ EMU countries67. Seasonally adjusted data for the three „old‟ EMU 
countries were gathered directly from the IMF‟s International Financial Statistics database, 
while data for the eight CEECs were seasonally adjusted by the author using the US Census 
Bureau‟s X12 seasonal adjustment procedure. Two sub-periods were studied to detect any 
change in the level of synchronisation in the period under consideration.
68
 
 The author finds a strong correlation of supply shocks between Hungary and the three 
„core‟ EMU countries after 1999, while Slovakia, Latvia and Estonia are found to be 
relatively highly correlated with two of the three EMU countries in the same period. 
Considering the entire ten-year period, Slovenia was found to be the country with the highest 
level of supply shocks symmetry. Similar to the findings of Darvas and Szapáry (2008), the 
author finds that the correlations for some countries are increasing through time, while 
decreasing for others. It cannot therefore be concluded that all CEECs are converging on 
synchronisation with the euro area. 
Regarding the correlation of demand shocks, most of the CEECs were found to be 
negatively correlated with Germany, France and Italy. It is suggested that disinflation, 
particularly in the second period, explains the asymmetry of demand shocks between the 
                                                 
65
 Longer periods were used where data was available, e.g. Slovakia, Estonia and Latvia are studied from 
1993Q1 and Czech Republic from 1994Q1.  
66
 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. 
67
 Germany, France and Italy. 
68
 Two five-year sub-periods were included in the study: 1995Q1 – 1999Q4 and 2000Q1 – 2004Q4. 
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countries examined. Thus, irregularities in the inflation rates of the CEEC countries may be 
seen to confirm the concerns expressed by Darvas and Szapáry (2008) described above. 
Finally, Savva, Neanidis and Osborn (2010) is the most recent published paper found 
to concentrate on the business cycle correlation between the CEECs and the euro area. In 
their study, the authors adopt the HP filter to de-trend a seasonally-adjusted monthly index of 
industrial production for twelve EU enlargement and negotiating members, as well as for 
existing euro area members.
69
 The sample period runs until June 2006. Bulgaria, Latvia and 
Malta are excluded due to data limitations.  
One of the main findings of the study is that business cycle synchronisation of the 
„new‟ EU members with the euro area has at least doubled, or gone from negative to positive, 
since the early 1990s. Indeed, business cycle convergence has been so rapid that some 
countries are found to have surpassed the periphery countries (identified as Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) and approach levels observed in the euro area core. 
Table 3 below includes the correlation coefficients produced in this most recent study 
side-by-side with the coefficients produced in Fidrmuc and Korhonen‟s earlier meta-analysis. 
With the exception of Romania, the positive trend in the degree of business cycle correlation 
appears to be confirmed despite the mixed findings of some other recent studies. 
 
 
Table 3: CEEC Business Cycle Correlation Coefficients with the Euro Area 
CEEC Fidrmuc and  
Korhonen (2006)
 70
 
Savva, Neanidis  
and Osborn (2010)
71
 
Hungary 0.36 0.68 
Slovenia 0.26 0.54 
Poland 0.25 0.49 
Czech R. 0.17 0.50 
Estonia 0.14 0.48 
Latvia 0.10 - 
Bulgaria 0.08 - 
Romania 0.07 -0.11 
Slovakia 0.01 0.38 
Lithuania -0.07 0.22 
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 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Turkey. 
70
 Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006, p.528) 
71
 HP de-trended monthly GDP data for period  1995:1 – 2006:6 (Data for Lithuania begins from 1997:1; data 
for Estonia ends 2005:12) 
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2.3: Endogenous Effects of EMU on the OCA Properties: The Empirical 
Evidence 
 
The application of the Lucas Critique to the OCA theory provided an insight into the 
dynamic nature of the OCA properties, profoundly altering the way in which the potential 
costs and benefits of monetary integration were viewed. An examination of the endogeneity 
effect of monetary union is important as, if proven, it suggests that even if the CEECs do not 
currently appear to be suitable candidates for EMU they may be better-qualified for 
membership after accession. It was shown in chapter one that there is a general assumption in 
favour of the endogeneity hypothesis at a theoretical level. However, it is important to 
examine the evidence at an empirical level to determine to what extent the endogeneity of the 
OCA properties can be relied upon in evaluating the economic rationale for monetary 
integration.  
Studies examining the endogeneity effect in the current euro area member countries 
provide a relevant point of reference. The trade creation effect of monetary integration was 
the starting point for the Frankel and Rose (1998) endogeneity hypothesis. Rose (2000) 
presents the first direct empirical examination of the endogeneity hypothesis, studying 
whether the international trade effects of a common currency exceed those that would arise 
under a fixed exchange rate regime.
72
 Rose‟s main finding was that countries using the same 
currency trade three times as much as comparable countries using separate currencies. The 
remarkable finding that the formation of a currency union could triple trade between 
participating countries became known as the „Rose effect‟73 and provoked a sizable empirical 
literature which aimed to verify whether trade effects of such magnitude were accurate.
74
 
Many of the early papers were critical of the econometric techniques and data employed in 
Rose‟s study. Persson (2001), for example, focuses on the suggested selection bias and 
revises Rose‟s trade effects down to between 13% and 66%.75 Rose and Van Wincoop 
(2001), meanwhile, use an estimated model developed in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001) 
to estimate the trade effects of EMU at 58% for the original eleven participating members.
76
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 Rose used the gravity model in his study, employing data between 1970 and 1990 from 186 countries. 
73
 See Baldwin and Taglioni (2004). 
74
 Baldwin (2006, p.42) writes of the “shrink-the-Rose-effect brigade”.  
75
 Baldwin (2006) provides a thorough examination an reassessment of the methodology used to determine the 
„Rose effect‟.  
76
 The model takes into account pre-currency union trade levels and assumes that countries that trade intensely 
with each other before forming a trade union will not experience as much of an increase in trade as countries 
which trade less intensely. Terming this assumption „multilateral trade resistance‟, Anderson and Van Wincoop 
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Following a swathe of studies into the actual trade creation effect of EMU, Frankel 
(2008b) calculates the central tendency of estimates to be between 10% and 15% in the first 
few years of currency union.
77
 He proposes a number of explanations for the difference in 
magnitude of the estimated trade effects of currency unions proposed by Rose and the 
evidence from EMU. Econometric techniques aside, the short period for which the euro has 
been in operation and the larger size of EMU countries compared with the small and very 
small (e.g. Kiribati, Mayotte) trade-dependent countries which were the focus of Rose‟s 
earlier study are put forward as possible explanations.
78
 Frankel also finds that larger 
countries have experienced a smaller boost to intra-monetary union trade in the EMU. 
Both the magnitude and the timing of the trade creation effect of monetary integration 
have been the subject of discussion in the literature. Contrary to Frankel‟s (2008b) finding of 
a trade creation effect within the first few years of monetary union, Frankel and Rose (1998), 
HM Treasury (2003) and Rose (2004) suggest that the full trade effects of monetary 
integration may take decades. This suggests that the endogeneity theory may only be relied 
upon over a protracted period of time.  
The second important link in Frankel and Rose‟s endogeneity hypothesis is the effect 
of trade intensity on business cycle correlation. Fidrmuc (2001) was one of the early 
contributors to examine the link between the increase in trade intensity and business cycle 
correlation.
79
 Although the author finds no direct link between trade intensity and business 
cycle correlation, intra-industry trade is shown to be a significant determinant of the 
convergence of business cycles. Fidrmuc concludes that his findings confirm the OCA 
endogeneity hypothesis to the extent that intra-industry trade is positively correlated with 
trade intensities. In their survey of the literature concerning the convergence of business 
cycles in the euro area, De Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008) produce further support for 
this finding, concluding that trade intensity explains only a fraction of business cycle 
correlations. 
Another interesting point to emerge from Fidrmuc‟s (2001) analysis is the finding that 
preparations for EMU were already exerting positive effects on the synchronisation of 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2001) subsequently revise down McCallum‟s (1995) estimates of the trade-reducing effects of the USA-Canada 
border from 2,200% to 44%.  
77
 Among the studies considered are Bun and Klaassen (2002), Flam and Nordström (2006), Chintrakarn (2008). 
78
 Although the average size of the EMU-participating countries is substantially larger than the smaller and more 
open, trade-dependent countries which were the focus of Rose‟s original study, Frankel (2008b, p.15) concludes 
that the effects of monetary union do not diminish discernibly with country size.  
79
 Fidrmuc examines a cross-section of OECD countries for the period 1990 – 1999. 
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business cycles in the early 1990s.
80
 With regard to the prospective accession of CEECs to 
the EMU, Fidrmuc judges that the intensity of trade between the CEECs and the euro area 
provides a sound basis for the fulfilment of the OCA criteria in the medium- to long-term. 
The empirical literature examining the endogenous effect of monetary integration has 
also branched out to consider determinants of business cycle correlation other than trade 
intensity. Artis, Fidrmuc and Scharler (2008), for example, find that while trade intensity, 
FDI flows and intra-industry trade do tend to strengthen business cycle correlation, the 
presence of labour market rigidities and divergent fiscal policies lower business cycle 
correlation irrespective of trade and financial integration. While the authors are optimistic 
about the effect the Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria will have on business cycle 
synchronisation, they warn of the risk that fiscal shocks and labour market rigidities may 
reverse the positive effects associated with the expected increase in trade and financial flows. 
The evidence presented so far has demonstrated tentative proof of the endogeneity of 
the business cycle correlation OCA property. Although studies have tended to find a positive 
trade creation effect as a result of monetary union, the timing and magnitude of this effect 
remains the subject of debate. To the extent that the endogeneity of business cycle correlation 
depends on the intensification of trade links, this casts doubts on the real effect of monetary 
union on business cycle convergence. Furthermore, studies have shown that the link between 
trade intensification and business cycle correlation is dependent on the creation of intra-
industry trade. 
Some recent studies have examined the direct effects of EMU on business cycle 
correlation in the euro area. Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2009) examine the characteristics 
of business cycles in the euro area from 1970 to 2006.
81
 The main finding of the analysis is 
that business cycles in the euro area have barely changed since the beginning of EMU. While 
this finding is interesting, the fact that only seven of the thirty-seven annual data points 
denote time spent in EMU represents a weakness in the study. 
Larsson, Gaco and Sikström (2011) take a novel approach to the relationship between 
European monetary integration and business cycle convergence. The authors examine the 
degree of convergence of the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish business cycles with 
the euro area from 1970 to 2009. The dramatically different degrees of European integration 
                                                 
80
 This supports the findings of Darvas, Rose and Szapáry (2005) and  Montoya and De Haan (2008) of a 
„Maastricht effect‟, whereby the implementation of structural reforms in a bid to fulfil the Maastricht criteria 
had the effect of increasing business cycle synchronisation in itself. 
81
 Due to the lack of available quarterly data over such a period, the authors use annual GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity to analyse the patterns of business cycle correlation. The annual growth rate is 
considered as the measure of business cycle correlation. 
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which characterise the Nordic countries provides for an interesting take on the effects of 
economic and monetary integration on business cycle correlation.
82
 The main finding of the 
study is that Denmark and Finland (with limited or no exchange rate flexibility vis-à-vis the 
euro) experienced significant business cycle convergence with the euro area between 1993 
and 2007.
83
 While this provides some evidence of the „Maastricht effect‟ noted above, the 
fact that Denmark is not an EMU participant means that the convergence may be attributable 
to the mere fixing of exchange rates and not as a result of monetary union. No similar effect 
is detected for Sweden, while Norway is found to show signs of divergence from the euro 
area. Separately, the authors note that the overheated economies of Ireland and Spain suggest 
that business cycle synchronisation has not converged enough for the ECB‟s single monetary 
policy to operate smoothly. 
Finally, in their examination of the early euro experience of the endogeneity theory 
Willett, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2010) note a strong word of caution in interpreting simple 
before-and-after comparisons in the endogeneity theory literature, pointing out the difficulty 
in distinguishing between the effects of EMU and broader effects of European integration. 
The authors point out that while the launch of the euro did coincide with rapid growth in 
reciprocal trade between EMU members, trade with non-EMU members also grew rapidly in 
that time. More significantly, however, it is found that business cycle correlation of non-euro 
area countries increased by a greater degree than countries participating in the euro area. The 
results of this examination undermine further the already weak evidence of the endogeneity 
of business cycles in EMU. 
 In order to achieve the required level of business cycle synchronisation without 
relying on the endogeneity theory after EMU accession, the authors emphasise the 
importance of ensuring sufficient structural reforms prior to membership if major crises are to 
be avoided. Observations from Marsh (2009) that economic reforms in Greece, Portugal and 
Italy slackened after EMU accession are used to emphasise this point. Failure to reform 
sufficiently, it is noted, may warrant major crises to bring about the reforms required in 
monetary union. The authors observe: “Unfortunately, the developments in the eurozone to 
date do not rule out the possibility that major crises may be needed to stimulate the types of 
reforms envisioned by OCA optimists” (Willett, Permpoon and Wihlborg, 2010, p.869). 
 
                                                 
82
 Finland is a euro area member; Denmark participates in ERM-II; Sweden is an EU member, but with a 
floating currency; Norway is a non-EU member with a floating currency. 
83
 For the same reason as Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2009), the authors focus on annual data. The business 
cycle is measured by de-trending real GDP data using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
47 
 
2.4: Implications of the Empirical Evidence for the Current Research Agenda 
 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the empirical OCA literature for evidence of 
how the OCA properties have been applied to the CEECs and what conclusions have been 
produced as to the economic rationale of EMU membership for them. Overall, studies have 
been broadly positive concerning the prospects for CEECs‟ participation in the euro area. A 
common conclusion in the empirical studies is that a number of the CEECs are at least as 
well suited to EMU membership as the current non-core euro area members. Schadler, et al. 
(2005) conclude that EMU membership will bestow substantial net gains on the countries of 
Central Europe in the long-term. 
The use of euro area periphery countries as a benchmark against which to compare the 
CEECs in their suitability for EMU membership is a prominent feature of the empirical OCA 
literature. However, recent economic difficulties in the eurozone periphery suggest that 
CEECs may need to perform considerably better on the OCA criteria if their experience in 
EMU is to be a positive one. Overheating and asset price bubbles in the Irish and Spanish 
economies indicate that ECB interest rates were too low for their economies.
84
 Additionally, 
a loss of competitiveness in Greece and Portugal since euro adoption indicates that structural 
rigidities have compromised the ability of alternative adjustment mechanisms to operate 
efficiently.
85
 
The assumption that CEECs are suitable candidates for EMU based on their relative 
position to the euro area periphery in terms of the OCA properties is no longer valid. This 
calls for a reassessment of the suitability of EMU membership for the CEECs using the cost-
benefit approach outlined in section 1.5. Significantly for this analysis, the National Bank of 
Poland (2009) report predicts an asymmetry in the timing of the costs and benefits of 
participation in monetary union. Although the expected benefits of monetary union are likely 
to materialise over the medium- to long-run, there is a greater potential for costs to 
materialise in the short-run. The threat that costs could potentially materialise shortly after 
EMU accession underlines the need to achieve a high degree of convergence with the euro 
area prior to accession.  
In outlining the analytical framework for this study in chapter one, similarity of 
shocks and of policy responses to shocks was identified as the OCA meta property which can 
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 See Larsson, Gaco and Sikström (2011). 
85
 Willett, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2010) highlight the findings in the political economy literature that major 
crises may be required for necessary structural reforms in economies like Greece and Portugal to be 
implemented. 
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best gauge the potential costs of participation in a monetary union. This property has been 
widely operationalised in the literature by measuring the degree of business cycle correlation 
between the CEECs and the euro area. Despite the range of methodologies and sample 
periods applied, the majority of findings indicate that the CEECs have experienced a 
significant increase in correlation with the euro area business cycle since the 1990s, albeit 
from a low, or negative, starting point.
86
 However, none of the published business cycle 
correlation studies reviewed utilised data after 2006. Additionally, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Croatia are frequently omitted from the studies. Given the observation that the degree of 
business cycle correlation with the euro area is changing for some countries, it is important to 
update these findings to examine the current degree of business cycle correlation.   
 In the absence of a high degree of business cycle correlation, ECB monetary policy 
may not be well-configured to economic conditions in the CEECs after euro adoption. The 
OCA theory suggests that alternative channels may facilitate adjustment to economic shocks 
in the absence of monetary policy autonomy. Three alternative adjustment mechanisms were 
identified in the analytical framework in section 1.5. Evidence from the empirical literature, 
however, suggests that these channels will have a limited scope to facilitate adjustment to 
shocks in the CEECs. 
Flexibility of wages and prices is the first such alternative adjustment channel and an 
OCA property which dates back to Friedman (1953). A high degree of wage flexibility is of 
particular importance to ensure that unemployment does not bear the brunt of asymmetric 
shocks in monetary union. However, evidence from empirical studies suggests that the scope 
for wage flexibility to facilitate adjustment to shocks is extremely limited. Both the CNB 
(2010) and NBP (2009) find a low elasticity of wages to labour market conditions in the 
Czech Republic and Poland. These findings are supported in a study of aggregate wage 
flexibility in the „new‟ EU Member States by Babecky (2008). The study finds that in the 
eight CEECs and three EMU members considered, real wages are inflexible and do not react 
to changes in the unemployment rate.
87
 Downward rigidities in wages in particular may result 
in an increase in unemployment in the event of a negative shock to the economy. 
Mobility of the factors of production was the second alternative adjustment channel 
identified in chapter one.
88
 While capital controls within the EU have been banned since the 
early 1990s, there is evidence that the low degree of financial market development in the 
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 See Savva, Neanidis and Osborn (2010).  
87
 The eight CEECs considered were: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. The three EMU members considered were: Austria, Greece and Portugal. 
88
 An OCA property proposed by Mundell (1961). 
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CEECs could limit the ability of this channel to absorb the effects of asymmetric shocks.
89
 
Additionally, regarding the mobility of labour, both NBP and CNB find that the configuration 
of taxes and benefits, together with legislative rigidities, have a strong negative impact on 
labour market flexibility. Furthermore, considering the costs of migration, labour mobility is 
a plausible adjustment mechanism only for permanent, long-term shocks (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1993) and unlikely to diminish the costs of monetary union which are likely to 
materialise in the short-term. 
The final alternative adjustment channel discussed in chapter one, the fiscal channel, 
is unlikely to facilitate adjustment to asymmetric shocks in EMU.
90
 No fiscal transfer 
mechanism similar to that operating in the USA or between the German Bundesländer 
operates in the EMU. Additionally, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) confines government 
deficits to 3% of GDP, restricting the scope for national governments to implement counter-
cyclical fiscal policies during downturns.
91
  
Although the EMU limits the extent to which the fiscal channel can facilitate 
adjustment to economic disturbances, public finances are also a potential source of 
asymmetric shocks. The CNB (2010) highlighted the drastic consolidation measures being 
imposed in Greece to demonstrate the risks that unsustainable public finances pose to 
countries in monetary union. To account for the possibility of more volatile economic 
fluctuations after accession to the EMU, the IMF report strongly recommends ensuring a 
prudent government debt burden of no more than 40%-50% prior to membership.
92
 Figure 4 
below illustrates the public debt burden on the CEECs as well as the EMU-16 unweighted 
average and the three EMU participants which required financial rescue packages from the 
EU-IMF.
93
 The CEECs can be generally characterised as having a lighter debt burden than 
the current euro area members. Hungary is the only CEEC whose public debt exceeds the 
EMU-16 average, and which also exceeds the 60% Maastricht criterion.  
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 See NBP (2009). 
90
 Kenen (1969) proposed that some degree of fiscal integration is a desirable OCA property. 
91
 Although the SGP technically limits the government deficit to 3% of GDP, it has been frequently and 
persistently breached, especially since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008.  
92
 This is stricter than the 60% debt burden limit in the Maastricht criteria. 
93
 Portugal became the third EMU member to require a financial rescue package in May 2011. See Wise (2011) 
for more details on the Portuguese rescue package. 
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Figure 4: Government Gross Debt as Percentage of GDP (2010)
94
 
 
 
The low proportion of fixed spending in budget expenditure means government 
spending is generally more flexible in the CEECs than in the euro area.
95
 However, both the 
NBP and CNB warn of the danger that rapidly rising public debt burdens threaten to change 
this and even impede their ability to comply with the Maastricht convergence criteria. Figure 
5 below shows the state of the CEEC public finances in 2010. With the exception of Estonia, 
which registered a modest budget surplus, all countries exceed the 3% limit set out in the 
SGP. Additionally, Hungary‟s continued accumulation of public debt not only makes EMU 
membership more risky, but also makes accession in the near future more difficult 
considering the Maastricht criteria. 
Turning to the benefits side of the analysis, most studies report that the CEECs are 
well-positioned to reap the benefits associated with increased trade integration due to the 
generally intense trade relations with the existing euro area. It is estimated in the reports that 
the overall benefits of euro adoption may be expected to add in the region of 0.7% to the 
annual output growth. 
The benefit of an expected fall in interest rates as a result of euro adoption also 
features prominently in the reports. NBP expects interest rates to fall substantially as a result 
of euro adoption, by as much as 2.4% in the long-term, leading to expected increase in 
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 Source: Eurostat database. Data for Croatia is an estimate from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. 
See Appendix 1a for full details of EU government finances. 
95
 See NBP (2009). 
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lending to the private sector. Some reports
96
 emphasise the importance of tight financial 
supervision and the willingness for fiscal restraint during economic upswings to mitigate the 
threats of asset price bubbles and wider financial instability.
97
 
 
 
Figure 5: Government Deficit as a Percentage of GDP (2010)
98
 
 
 
 
Finally, weak evidence of the endogeneity effect of monetary union in the case of the 
EMU suggests that endogeneity of the OCA properties should not be relied upon in 
considering the economic rationale for membership. It cannot be assumed that the CEECs 
will become better EMU candidates after accession. 
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 See, for example, Schadler, et al. (2005) and  NBP (2009). 
97
 Larsson, Gaco and Sikström (2011) have already mentioned the effect of  sub-optimally low interest rates on 
the Irish and Spanish economies. 
98
 Source: Eurostat database. Data for Croatia is an estimate from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. 
See Appendix 1a for full details of EU government finances. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
 
 Having considered the evidence from the theoretical and empirical OCA literature, the 
aim of this chapter is to empirically apply the OCA theory to the CEECs in order to evaluate 
the current economic rationale of EMU membership. In accordance with developments in the 
OCA literature, this will be achieved by embedding the OCA properties in the cost-benefit 
analytical framework outlined in chapter one.  
 On the cost side of the analysis, relinquishment of monetary policy sovereignty 
represents the most significant potential cost associated with formation of a monetary union. 
Mongelli (2002) identified symmetry of shocks and of policy responses to shocks as an OCA 
meta property which gauges the potential for this cost to arise. This property has received 
particularly close attention in the empirical OCA literature, which operationalises it by 
calculating the degree of business cycle correlation between constituent members of a 
monetary union. A high level of correlation between members‟ economic activity increases 
the likelihood that the single monetary policy will be appropriately configured to economic 
conditions throughout the union. 
Although the alternative adjustment mechanisms identified in chapter one are relevant 
to the analysis, evidence from the empirical literature demonstrated their limited ability to 
facilitate adjustment to shocks in EMU. This finding reinforces the importance of achieving a 
high degree of business cycle correlation prior to EMU membership if potential costs are to 
be avoided. As such, business cycle correlation will be the main focus of the cost side of the 
analysis. 
 Turning to the benefit side of the analysis, elimination of transaction costs and 
exchange rate risk represent the most significant immediate benefits to arise from monetary 
union.
99
 The extent to which a country is set to gain from these benefits will be gauged here 
                                                 
99
 The attendant effects of trade creation and increase in economic growth are likely to develop over a longer 
period of time. See NBP (2009). 
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by two indicators. The first is the openness of an economy to trade, which serves a dual 
purpose in the OCA analytical framework. Firstly, it indicates the extent to which a country 
will benefit from the elimination of transaction costs and exchange rate risk. Secondly, it 
indicates the usefulness of an independent monetary policy. McKinnon (1963) showed that 
the transmission of changes in the international price of tradables to the general domestic 
price index in open economies reduces the effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate as an 
adjustment instrument. The second indicator to be considered will be the degree of trade 
integration between the CEECs and the euro area. This is a more precise estimator of the 
extent to which the CEECs will benefit from the elimination of transaction costs and 
exchange rate uncertainty as they will only apply to trade with euro area countries. 
 The OCA properties will be considered in a static analytical framework. Evidence 
from over eleven years of EMU has shed doubt on the magnitude of the endogenous effect of 
monetary union on the OCA properties, indicating that it cannot be relied upon for an 
improvement in suitability for membership ex-post. Indeed, the poor economic performance 
of the euro area periphery in recent years has highlighted the need to ensure the conditions 
which justify the economic rationale for EMU membership are in place prior to accession.  
The cases of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, all of which have required emergency 
rescue packages since 2010, are testament to the potential threats associated with EMU 
membership. Above all, their cases demonstrate the utmost importance of ensuring a 
sustainable fiscal position in monetary union. However, evidence from previous empirical 
analyses that peripheral countries‟ business cycles tended to be less correlated with the euro 
area core indicates that lack of business cycle correlation may also have played a role in 
generating their economic crises.
100
 These three countries will feature prominently in the 
analysis which follows. Along with the unweighted average of the EMU-16, the OCA 
properties will be applied to Greece, Ireland and Portugal so as to better understand the 
relative suitability of EMU membership for the CEECs. 
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 Larsson, Gaco and Sikström (2011) have already suggested sub-optimally low interest rates were partly to 
blame for economic overheating in Ireland and Spain. 
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3.1 Business Cycle Correlation  
  
3.1.1 Econometric Methodology 
 
Before measuring the degree of business cycle correlation between countries, it is 
important to first precisely define the business cycle. Two popular notions of business cycles 
exist in the literature: the classical business cycle and the deviation business cycle (Artis, 
Marcellino and Proietti, 2004). The classical business cycle can be defined as the absolute 
expansions and contractions of economic activity.
101
 The deviation cycle, meanwhile, can be 
described as the deviation of economic activity about a trend, i.e. economic fluctuations about 
a trend. It is the latter definition which represents the more promising and appropriate version 
of the business cycle
102
 and the one which has been the focus of most recent business cycle 
studies.
103
 Accordingly, it is the deviation business cycle which will be the focus of this 
study. 
Business cycle correlation will be measured by calculating the correlation between 
de-trended aggregate output data. For the purpose of this study, this method holds a number 
of advantages over the SVAR approach. Firstly, de-trended aggregate output data captures 
both the occurrence of shocks and the responses to those shocks. The SVAR approach, 
meanwhile, is restricted to examining the correlation of demand and supply shocks and does 
not capture the response to those shocks.
104
 As the meta OCA criterion depends on incidence 
and adaptability to shocks, the former approach is the more appropriate and informative for 
the purpose of this study.  
In addition to this, a number of empirical issues have been highlighted with the 
application of the SVAR technique to the CEECs. Considering that data is available for most 
CEECs only from the mid-1990s (and in some cases later),  the long-run restriction applied in 
the SVAR model to recover supply and demand shocks from output and inflation data calls 
the robustness of this approach into question.
105
 Indeed, the use of the SVAR model has been 
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 See Burns and Mitchell (1946) for an early detailed discussion on the measurement of business cycles. 
102
 Artis, Marcellino and Proietti (2004, p.2) 
103
 De Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008, p.236) state: “A practical reason why most researchers focus on 
deviation cycles is that most (parametric) measures used to describe the cycle need stationary series as input. 
Furthermore, since most economies are growing over time classical recessions occur much less frequently than 
growth cycle recessions”. 
104
 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), for example, choose the SVAR approach over the de-trending approach 
because the de-trending approach fails to distinguish disturbances from responses.  
105
 See, for example, Darvas and Szapáry (2008). 
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questioned even for countries for which much longer time-series are available.
106
 In 
particular, Cooley and Dwyer (1998) question the effectiveness of the restrictions used to 
identify shocks and the overall reliability of SVARs for identifying the relative importance of 
shocks.
107
  
 Output data will first be de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Although 
three is no consensus on the best filter to estimate the business cycle, this is the most widely 
used in applied work.
108
 It has also has been employed in many empirical studies researching 
the business cycle correlation between CEECs and the euro area.
109
 Developed by Hodrick 
and Prescott (1997),
110
 the conceptual framework behind the filter is that an output time 
series (yt) can be decomposed into a growth component (gt), or trend, and a cyclical 
component (ct), such that: 
  yt = g t + ct   for t = 1,…T.      (1)  
The HP filter removes the smoothed trend component from the time series by softly 
imposing a linearity constraint to the series while at the same time penalising deviations from 
the trend. This is achieved by minimising the following problem: 
 (2) 
where the first term is the sum of the squared deviations of the actual series from the fitted 
trend series. The second term represents the sum of the squares of the trend‟s second 
differences and is a multiple of the parameter, λ. The parameter, λ, is used to modify the 
relative importance of the two terms and penalises deviations of the actual series from the 
fitted trended series. The higher the value of λ, the more linear is the trend component. 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) recommend a λ value of 1,600 for quarterly time series data.111 
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 See Faust and Leeper (1997). 
107
 Cooley and Dwyer (1998, p. 86). 
108
 Kaiser and Maravall (2002), who also highlight its widespread use among organisations such as the IMF, 
OECD and ECB. 
109
 The HP filter has been applied in studies by: Boreiko (2003); Artis, Marcellino and Proietti (2004); Darvas 
and Szapáry (2005, 2008) and Savva, Neanidis and Osborn (2010). 
110
 An unpublished version of this paper was available since 1980: mimeo from Carnegie-Mellon University, 
Pittsburgh, PA. 
111
 See Hodrick and Prescott (1997, p. 4). 
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 Despite the popularity of the HP filter, it is not without its weaknesses.
112
 To ensure 
the robustness of the results, the band-pass filter developed by Christiano and Fitzgerald 
(2003) will also be used.
113
 In applying the CF filter, only time-series data frequencies within 
a certain range are passed; high frequency fluctuations and low frequency fluctuations (which 
reflect the growth trend component) are rejected, thereby indentifying the cyclical component 
in the time-series.
114
 This different approach to de-trending should provide robustness to the 
results obtained using the HP filter. 
 
 
3.1.2: Data 
 
Seasonally-adjusted quarterly real GDP data from 1995Q1 to 2010Q4 is collected 
from Eurostat for all EU Member States and Croatia.
115
 Seasonally-adjusted quarterly real 
GDP for the same period is also collected for a fixed sixteen-country composition of 
aggregate euro area activity, against which correlation for each of the countries will be 
examined.
116
 Real GDP was chosen over industrial production for purposes of this study 
having considered the views of De Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008) that studies of 
business cycle synchronisation should focus on the broadest possible output variable. 
Although data is available for some countries prior to 1995, the distorting effects of 
the transitional recession on pre-1995 data may significantly and adversely affect the 
correlation coefficients for the period under examination. The quarterly data frequency was 
chosen in line with other empirical analyses of business cycle synchronisation.
117
 The low 
number of annual data points in the CEECs and the fact that such data may hide shocks to 
                                                 
112
 The potential effect of the instability of the endpoint estimate of the data series on the results is an issue 
frequently raised in the literature. See, for example, Kaiser and Maravall (2002) and Mise, Kim and Newbold 
(2005). 
113
 Together the HP and CF filters are the two most widely adopted filters in the literature.  
114
 Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) note, in particular, that their version of the band-pass filter performs better 
than the HP filter especially towards the end of the sample period where the endpoint issue arises for the HP 
filter. 
115
 Real GDP data is measured in millions of the national currency. Data for Greece, Malta and Romania are 
available only from 2000Q1. Data from Bulgaria and Ireland are available from 1997Q1. For Czech Republic, 
data is available only from 1996Q1. 
116
 A number of studies choose to examine correlation with a core euro area member, most frequently Germany 
(see Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006). However, as the European Central Bank will set interest rates based on 
economic conditions in the euro area as a whole (and not solely in Germany), it is this economy which will be 
considered in monetary policy decisions. Therefore, it makes more sense to examine correlation with the EMU-
16 business cycle for the purpose of this study. 
117
 See, for example, Artis, Fidrmuc and Scharler (2008), Darvas and Szapáry (2005, 2008) and Mikek (2009) 
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which the economy has adjusted during the year means that an annual frequency is 
inappropriate in this instance.
118
 The use of annual data would also mean that adjustments in 
output during the year would not be included. Use of monthly output data was ruled out due 
to the fact that data may be subject to excessive noise and be influenced by seasonal factors.  
All data is first logged, before being filtered using each of the filters described 
above.
119
 Once the data has been filtered and the cyclical component has been identified for 
each country and for the euro area, the correlation is tested for each country against the euro 
area aggregate for the sixteen-year period 1995Q1 to 2010Q4.
120
 The data is then divided into 
two non-overlapping sub-periods: 1995Q1 – 2004Q1 and 2004Q2 – 2010Q4. The purpose of 
this exercise is to examine whether there is a tendency of correlation convergence between 
the individual CEEC business cycles and the euro area. The structural break point was chosen 
to reflect the accession of ten new Member States to the EU Single Market on 1 May 2004.
121
 
A third sub-period, stretching from 1995Q1 to 2008Q1, will also be examined so as to 
examine whether the financial crisis has any effect on the results.
122
 
Finally, three lags are calculated for each of the CEECs and correlated with the euro 
area aggregate in order to test for which lag length correlation is the highest. As it is more 
likely that the euro area economic activity influences activity of the CEECs rather than vice 
versa, lags are not calculated for the euro area. If the highest recorded correlation with the 
euro area is that without a lag, then the correlation is contemporaneous and the business 
cycles can be said to move more in tandem. If it is found that the first lag of a country‟s 
business cycle is more correlated with the euro area than the non-lagged time-series, it could 
be concluded that there is a delay in the transmission of the euro area business cycle of 
approximately three months. For the purpose of this study, high contemporaneous correlation 
of business cycles is desirable for prospective currency union members.  
                                                 
118
 See Mikek (2009). 
119
 The natural logarithm of all data is used throughout as percentage deviations from the trend are more useful 
for the analysis. This allows for the relative magnitude of the fluctuations around the trend can be assessed and 
compared. See Savva, Neanidis and Osborn (2010). 
120
 Data for Bulgaria and Ireland begin from 1997Q1. Data for Romania, Greece and Malta begin from 2000Q1. 
Additionally, no 2010Q4 data was yet available for Greece and Luxembourg at the time of testing. 
121
 This is not true for all countries in the sample. However, it is true for the majority of the countries at the 
focus of the study and will nonetheless serve its main purpose of providing evidence of convergence or 
divergence with the euro area business cycle. The sub-periods will be applied to all countries to ensure 
comparability of the results.  
122
 CNB (2010) found a significant increase in business cycle correlation between a number of European 
countries and the euro area as a result of the financial crisis. A caveat of this result, however, is that the data was 
not de-trended. It was decided that 2008Q1 would mark the endpoint of this sub-period as it represents the peak 
of real GDP achieved in the EMU-16 before real output began its decline. 
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3.1.3 Results 
 
 Before examining the correlation coefficients produced by the tests, it is useful to first 
visually inspect the data. Figure 6 below presents the business cycles of the CEECs and the 
three peripheral euro area countries alongside the EMU-16 business cycle. The y-axis 
represents percentage deviations from the trend which has been extracted from the data using 
the HP filter.
123
 
The most striking feature of all the business cycles presented is the observable effect 
of the global financial crisis in 2008. A sharp decline in output in 2009 preceded by a period 
of accelerating economic growth can be observed in all countries. The peak to trough decline 
in growth caused by the crisis appears to have been steeper than at any time in the sixteen-
year period examined for all countries.
124
  
With the exception of Croatia and Romania, growth appears to have recovered in the 
CEECs in line with the recovery in the euro area aggregate since late 2009. Poland is the only 
CEEC to experience a deceleration in growth less severe than the euro area aggregate, 
reflecting the fact that it was the only EU country to avoid recession as a result of the 2008 
financial crisis.
125
 However, its recovery has been more muted than elsewhere in Europe and 
output growth remains below its trend.  
 Considering the entire sixteen-year period, of the CEECs, the Hungarian and Czech 
business cycles appear most aligned with that of the euro area over the full period. After 
some volatility in the mid-late 1990s, output fluctuations of these two countries appear to 
have fallen broadly in line with those of the euro area. This observation supports the findings 
of previous studies which generally found the Hungarian business cycle to be most correlated 
with the euro area.  
 The business cycles of the Baltic countries appear remarkably similar, especially since 
2000, when correlation with the euro area appears to have begun to converge after a period of 
divergent output patterns. While correlation with the euro area does appear to have increased, 
fluctuations are markedly more pronounced than the euro area aggregate, with all three 
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 Fluctuations below zero do not necessarily signify negative growth, but a change in output which is below 
the trend. An overall positive trend in growth was observed for all countries considered over the sixteen-year 
period examined. 
124
 A short period of relative output stability in Bulgaria separates a period of rapid output growth in 1997 from 
a steep deceleration in growth in 1999. A period of hyperinflation in 1997 in Bulgaria and Romania may distort 
output data for that period and partly explain the exclusion of Bulgaria and Romania from a number of empirical 
business cycle correlation studies. See Mikek (2009). 
125
 Based on quarterly GDP growth data from the Eurostat database. 
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experiencing more rapid growth and deeper recessions in the late-2000s compared with any 
other country.  
 Regarding the three other CEECs, business cycles between Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania and the euro area appear to have achieved a considerable degree of convergence 
until 2008. Croatia and Romania appear to be struggling to recover from recession, while the 
Bulgarian recovery appears up to three to six months out of sync with that of the euro area.  
 Evidence from the euro area periphery is mixed. While correlation between the Irish 
and Portuguese business cycles with the euro area aggregate appears higher than among the 
CEECs, fluctuation appear markedly more volatile and the economic recovery in late 2010 
appears to have faltered in both countries. It is immediately apparent from Greece, however, 
that despite some degree of alignment between 2005 and 2008, correlation appears very low. 
The continued sharp decline in output in 2010 enhances this observation. 
 
 
Figure 6: HP de-trended Business Cycles 
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Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the CEECs under 
examination, three peripheral euro area countries and the unweighted average of the sixteen 
euro area countries over the full period of the sample and for three sub-periods.
126
 The results 
are graded according to the coefficients calculated using the HP filter for the full sample 
period, from highest to lowest. Correlation coefficients calculated using the CF filter, used to 
ensure the robustness of the results, are included in parentheses beneath. 
 
 
Table 4: Summary Table of Correlation Coefficients  
Country Pre-crisis: 
1995Q1 – 
2008Q1 
Full Period: 
1995Q1 – 
2010Q4 
 Sub-period 1: 
1995Q1 – 
2004Q1 
Sub-period 2: 
2004Q2 – 
2010Q4 
Ireland 0.84 0.86 
 
0.72 0.91 
 (0.96) (0.95) 
 
(0.92) (0.97) 
EMU-16 0.81 0.83 
 
0.64 0.90 
 (0.85) (0.87) 
 
(0.66) (0.92) 
Czech R. 0.75 0.81 
 
0.36 0.94 
 (0.82) (0.88) 
 
(0.66) (0.98) 
Hungary 0.68 0.80 
 
0.54 0.89 
 (0.82) (0.89) 
 
(0.69) (0.95) 
Croatia 0.81 0.80 
 
0.39 0.88 
 (0.82) (0.83) 
 
(0.38) (0.90) 
Latvia 0.71 0.80 
 
0.15 0.94 
 (0.89) (0.92) 
 
(0.69) (0.98) 
Portugal 0.76 0.79 
 
0.71 0.91 
 (0.88) (0.91) 
 
(0.76) (0.98) 
Estonia 0.61 0.75 
 
0.01 0.94 
 (0.75) (0.84) 
 
(0.34) (0.98) 
Romania 0.79 0.71 
 
0.78 0.74 
 (0.65) (0.66) 
 
(0.53) (0.70) 
Lithuania 0.40 0.62 
 
-0.48 0.92 
 (0.53) (0.72) 
 
(-0.24) (0.94) 
Poland 0.56 0.58 
 
0.34 0.85 
 (0.62) (0.72) 
 
(0.47) (0.89) 
Bulgaria 0.43 0.54 
 
0.10 0.76 
 (0.44) (0.61) 
 
(0.06) (0.77) 
Greece 0.64 0.45 
 
-0.03 0.54 
 (0.44) (0.27) 
 
(-0.85) (0.40) 
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 Full details of the remaining EU countries are detailed in Appendices 2a and 2b. 
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Overall, the correlation coefficients for the full sixteen-year period produced using 
HP-filtered data are, on average, 0.05 lower than the coefficients produced using CF-filtered 
data. Despite this difference, results of the CF-filtered data prove the robustness of the HP-
filtered results as the relative ranking of the level of the correlation coefficients is broadly 
similar.
127
 Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands are found to be the four most highly 
correlated with the eurozone aggregate using both filters.
128
 Meanwhile, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Malta and Romania are the least-correlated with the eurozone 
aggregate regardless of which filter has been applied. To simplify the analysis, discussion 
will now focus on the results of the HP filter. 
The first observation to make is that CEEC business cycles have made considerable 
progress in converging with the euro area. Considering the full sample period, the results here 
show that in the last number of years the CEECs have achieved a reasonably high degree of 
business cycle correlation with the euro area. The correlation coefficients for all CEECs are 
higher than those of the most recent comparable study (Savva, Neanidis and Osborn, 2010) 
reviewed in chapter two. The results therefore confirm the trend found in some studies that 
the CEEC business cycles are converging with the euro area.
129
  
The division of the sample into two sub-periods confirms the observation that 
business cycles between the CEECs and the euro area are converging. With the exception of 
Romania, a strong increase in business cycle correlation with the eurozone can be observed in 
all other CEECs since the 1990s.
130
 The pace of convergence between the CEECs and the 
euro area exceeds the observed convergence within the euro area itself. The increase from 
0.64 to 0.90 is a positive indication that the business cycles in the euro area are becoming 
more correlated which should simplify monetary policy decisions of the ECB and improve 
configuration of monetary policy to economic conditions among EMU participants.  
The convergence of the Baltic economies has been particularly strong. Uncorrelated 
with the euro area in the first sub-period, progress towards convergence has been so rapid that 
                                                 
127
 Considering the full sample period, the difference between the coefficients produced using the HP and CF 
filters is largest in the case of Greece, which has a difference of 0.18. Despite this large difference, both methods 
place Greece as the least-correlated country with the euro area in the entire EU. De Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-
Pin (2008) also found that the findings based on different filters are similar despite the fact that different filters 
extract different types of information. 
128
 These countries are frequently considered to be among the core euro area countries. See, for example, Darvas 
and Szapáry (2008) and Mikek (2009). These results support the credibility of the overall findings. 
129
 Savva, Neanidis and Osborn (2010) found that business cycle correlation between the CEECs and the euro 
area has at least doubled, or gone from negative to positive, since the early 1990s. Fidrmuc and Korhonen 
(2006), too, observed a positive trend in business cycle convergence between the CEECs and the euro area. 
Others, such as Darvas and Szapáry (2008) and Mikek (2009) found convergence only for some CEECs. 
130
 Data limitations in the case Romania shortens the first sub-period to 2000Q1-2004Q1 which may explain this 
unusual finding. 
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they have overtaken a number of CECs and peripheral eurozone countries.
131
 Poland, 
previously considered to be among the highest-correlated of the CEECs with the euro area, 
has been out-paced by the rate of convergence in other countries and is now one of the least-
correlated CEECs with the euro area over the full sample period. 
The exclusion of post-2008Q1 data from the full sample period to determine the 
effects the financial crisis has had on the degree of business cycle correlation produces a 
number of interesting findings. The crisis appears to have had a neutral effect on the average 
correlation of business cycles within the euro area.
132
 However, the crisis is found to have 
had a strong and significantly negative impact on the correlation of the Greek economy with 
the euro area.
133
 This is unsurprising after the visual inspection of the data illustrated the 
recent strong divergence of the Greek business cycle. Among the CEECs, there is evidence of 
a less significant but negative impact on the business cycle correlations of Romania and 
Croatia with the euro area. 
Lags were also applied to the CEEC business cycles over the full sample period to 
obtain more information on the nature of correlation with the euro area.
134
 With the exception 
of Poland, adding lags was found to reduce the degree of correlation recorded between the 
CEECs and euro area.
135
 This indicates that correlation between the eurozone and most 
CEECs is contemporaneous, which is a positive sign as it strengthens the nature of 
correlation.
136
 
In characterising the degree of business cycle correlation with the euro area, the 
CEECs can be divided into three sub-groups. In the first are the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Croatia and Latvia. The business cycles of these countries have achieved a reasonably high 
degree of correlation with the euro area and are just slightly lower than the average 
correlation within the euro area itself. Despite significant recent progress towards business 
cycle convergence with the euro area, this indicates that the chance that ECB monetary policy 
may be poorly-configured to the economic conditions in these countries cannot be ruled out. 
                                                 
131
 The negative correlation of Lithuania and extremely low correlation of Latvia and Estonia before EU 
accession in 2004 are supported by the findings of Fidrmuc and Korhonen‟s (2006) meta-analysis of earlier 
CEEC business cycle correlation studies. 
132
 A modest increase in correlation is observed by including post-2008Q1 data, although this may be accounted 
for by the generally positive convergence trend observed over the full sample period. 
133
 This is confirmed by results from both filters.  
134
 Full details of the results can be found in Appendices 2c and 2d. 
135
 This was not found to be the case when the CF filter was applied to the data. 
136
 Darvas and Szapáry (2008) found that lags of up to three quarters produced the highest correlation 
coefficients between some CEECs and the euro area. 
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Considering the strong evidence that CEEC business cycles continue to converge with the 
eurozone, however, this risk should continue to shrink as time passes. 
Estonia and Lithuania can be placed into the second sub-group. These countries 
exhibit a lower degree of correlation with the euro area than the countries identified in the 
first sub-group. However, evidence of exceptionally rapid convergence to the euro area 
business cycle is detected from both countries since EU accession. Although there is a risk 
that ECB monetary policy may be poorly-configured to economic conditions in these 
countries considering evidence from the full sample period, this risk should be expected to 
decrease rapidly given the observed trend of rapid convergence. 
Romania, Poland and Bulgaria can be placed in a third sub-group. These countries 
also exhibit a lower degree of business cycle correlation than the eurozone average. However, 
their rate of convergence is somewhat slower than that observed in Estonia and Lithuania. 
For these countries a more substantial, although weakening, risk remains that the ECB‟s 
monetary policy could create economic imbalances. 
 
 
3.2: Openness and Trade Integration 
 
Originally proposed by McKinnon (1963) as an OCA criterion, the openness of an 
economy to external trade serves a dual purpose in the OCA analytical framework. The cost 
to open (and often small) economies of relinquishment of sovereign monetary policy can be 
expected to be lower for countries whose economies depend significantly on international 
trade. Additionally, openness to trade can be viewed as an indicator of how much a country 
will benefit from the formation of a monetary union. Tower and Willett (1976) were one of 
the first to highlight the enhanced usefulness of money in monetary union being of particular 
benefit to those countries which are more open to trade. The savings in terms of transaction 
costs and the elimination of exchange rate risk will be of greater benefit to a country the 
greater it depends on trade. 
Figure 7 below presents the degree of openness of each of the CEEC economies, the 
three eurozone periphery countries and the unweighted average of the EMU-16. Openness is 
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calculated as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP.
137
 To take account of 
volatile trade data as a result of the financial crisis, the 2008-2010 three-year average is 
calculated instead of focusing on just one year. 
 
Figure 7: Total Imports and Exports as Percentage of GDP (2008-2010 average)
138
 
 
The data demonstrate that the degree of openness varies widely both among the 
CEECs and among eurozone economies. With the combined value of imports and exports 
totalling 117% over the past three years, the average degree of openness in the euro zone is 
very high. Five CEECs (Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria) exhibit 
an extremely high level of openness and exceed the average degree of openness in the EMU. 
Just Latvia, Poland, Croatia and Romania are less open than the euro area average. As the 
two largest CEECs in this study, Poland and Romania may be expected to demonstrate lower 
trade dependence given the tendency of larger, more-diversified countries to rely less on 
international trade. Nevertheless, with combined imports and exports amounting to 73% of 
GDP, Romania, as the least open of the CEECs studied, still exhibits a reasonably high 
degree of international trade dependency. 
The openness of the three euro zone peripheral countries varies extremely widely. All 
CEECs in the sample exceed the degree of openness observed in Greece and Portugal.
139
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 All data is sourced from Eurostat. Exports and imports are of both goods and services at current prices and 
are non-seasonally adjusted.  
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 Full details for all EMU countries including a year-by-year breakdown can be found in Appendix 3a. 
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Such low levels of openness are surprising given the relatively small size of these economies 
and indicate a relatively low potential to generate benefits from participation in monetary 
union. At the other end, however, none of the CEECs match Ireland in their degree of 
openness. Above all, this demonstrates the diversity of the economies participating in the 
EMU. 
The data presented here indicate that given the CEEC economies depend to a 
reasonably high degree on international trade, the effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate 
as an adjustment instrument is relatively low. This is especially true for the exceptionally 
highly trade-dependent economies of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and 
Bulgaria.  
However, it is the degree of trade integration with the participating members in 
monetary union which is a more accurate indicator of how well-positioned an economy is to 
benefit from monetary integration. Upon accession to monetary union, a country should be 
directing a substantial share of its exports to and sourcing a substantial share of its imports 
from other currency union members if it is to benefit from the elimination of transaction costs 
and exchange rate risk. Otherwise trade will continue to be subject to transaction costs and 
exchange rate risk with non-monetary union participants. In Figure 8, the degree of trade 
integration with the euro area is calculated as the sum of imports and exports with the euro 
area as a percentage of GDP.
140
 Again, the average over the three-year period from 2008 to 
2010 is considered so as to account for the volatility of the data. 
The trade integration data presents a markedly different picture to the general 
openness data. On average, 37% of euro area countries‟ international trade is with other euro 
area countries. The particularly stark difference in Ireland, for example, may be accounted for 
by its intense trade relations with non-euro area countries including the UK and the USA.
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Similarly, intra-CEEC trade may account for much of the difference observed among the 
CEECs.
142
 The exceptionally low amount Greece trades with other euro area members is 
particularly striking. Despite participating in the EMU for over eleven years, imports and 
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 With the combined value of imports and exports totalling just 53% of GDP Greece is, along with France, the 
least-open of all euro area countries. 
140
 Trade integration of current eurozone members is calculated as the sum of imports and exports with other 
euro area members as a percentage of GDP. The EMU-16 is the unweighted average of those calculations. 
141
 Thus, while the openness of its economy reduces the cost of relinquishing monetary policy autonomy, deep 
trade relations with other non-EMU countries limits the extent to which Ireland can benefit from the elimination 
of transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty. 
142
 This observation highlights a limitation of the static nature of this analysis. As the EMU expands to include 
more countries (such as the accession of Estonia on 1 January 2011), the figures here will change. Assuming 
Latvia, for example, enjoys close trade links with Estonia, its accession to the euro area will place Latvia in a 
better position to benefit from eurozone accession. 
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exports with the euro area total just 14% of GDP, by far the lowest of any CEEC or euro 
country.
143
 
 
 
Figure 8: Total Imports and Exports with the Euro Area as Percentage of GDP (2008-2010 
average)
144
 
 
 Based on the data, the CEECs can again be divided into three groups. In the first are 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. Their economies are extremely highly dependent on trade 
with the EMU; the value of trade exceeds 70% of output in both cases. This substantially 
exceeds the average found within the eurozone and indicates that these two economies are 
particularly well-positioned to benefit from EMU membership.  
Estonia, Bulgaria and Poland can be placed in the second group. All three exhibit a 
degree of trade integration similar to the EMU average and are better-placed to benefit from 
euro area membership than the three EMU peripheral countries of Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece.  
The final group includes Romania, Croatia, Lithuania and Latvia. The degree of trade 
integration between these countries and the euro area is relatively low, falling short of the 
levels observed in Ireland and Portugal, although above the level observed in Greece. The 
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 Italy is next lowest, where the comparable figure was 20%. 
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 Full details for all EU countries including a year-by-year breakdown can be found in Appendix 3b. 
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data for these countries indicate that they will benefit less from the elimination of transaction 
costs compared to most other European countries. 
  
 
3.3: Economic Rationale of EMU Membership for the CEECs 
 
 Having highlighted the limited ability of alternative adjustment mechanisms to 
prevent economic imbalances in the event of an asymmetric shock, attention on the cost side 
of the analysis has focused on the degree of business cycle correlation between the CEECs 
and the euro area. The danger that the single monetary policy of the ECB may not be well-
configured to the economic conditions of an acceding country is a threat which may arise in 
the short-term. The immediate threat that costs might arise in the short-term underlines the 
importance that the economic rationale of EMU membership is justified for each CEEC prior 
to membership. The weak endogenous effect of EMU membership on the OCA properties 
and economic crises in the eurozone periphery further underscore the necessity to guarantee, 
as far as possible, that participation in the EMU will have a positive effect on the welfare of 
acceding countries.  
On the benefit side of the analysis, attention focused on the openness of the CEECs to 
trade with the euro area. Although benefits in the form of elimination of transaction costs and 
exchange rate risk with other EMU members will also be felt in the short-term, attendant 
trade creation and growth boosting effects will take longer to materialise.  
 Before analysing the findings in detail, it is useful to first illustrate the results of the 
two main OCA properties examined. Figure 9 below plots the relative performance of the 
CEECs, the three EMU peripheral countries and the EMU-16 with regard to the degrees of 
business cycle correlation and trade intensity with the euro area. Concerning suitability of 
participation in EMU, countries placed in the top right corner, which demonstrate high 
degrees of both business cycle correlation and trade intensity with the euro area, can be 
considered the best candidates. Countries towards the bottom left hand corner, meanwhile, 
can expect to benefit least from participation in EMU.  
 From the graph, the Czech Republic and Hungary appear to be the best-positioned of 
the CEECs to benefit from euro adoption. None of the remaining countries examined clearly 
out-perform the average EMU-16 on the basis of these two criteria. Another observation from 
the graph is the exceptionally poor positioning of Greece. Greece‟s especially low degree of 
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trade intensity with the euro area means that it has benefited little from the elimination of 
transaction costs. Additionally, its low degree of business cycle correlation with the euro area 
implies that Greece is most at risk of suffering from an ECB monetary policy ill-configured 
to its economic conditions. In fact, the results of both tests found that Greece was the least 
suitable country for participation in EMU of all EU countries. The fact that Greece was the 
first eurozone country to require emergency external financial assistance indicates that this 
may indeed be the case and lends credibility to the OCA properties in evaluating the 
economic rationale of monetary integration. 
 
 
Figure 9: Business Cycle Correlation and Trade Intensity
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In evaluating the economic rationale of EMU membership for the CEECs, it is useful 
to divide the countries into two groups based on their current exchange rate arrangements. 
Estonia has adopted the euro already, although before 2011 it, like Lithuania and Bulgaria, 
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 Business cycle correlation refers to the results obtained using the HP filter for the full sample period 
(1995Q1 – 2010Q4). Trade intensity is the average of the sum of imports and exports with the euro area over the 
three year period (2008 – 2010). 
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operated a currency board arrangement with the rate fixed to the euro.
146
 Latvia, too, operates 
a fixed exchange rate regime, although one with slightly more flexibility to move about a 
narrow band. These four fall into the first group. The second group includes Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania which operate flexible exchange rate 
regimes.  
  By operating fixed exchange rate regimes, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria 
have effectively relinquished monetary policy autonomy and have thus already accepted the 
primary cost associated with participation in the EMU.
147
 The decision to operate fixed 
exchange rate arrangements is unsurprising considering the small, open nature of their 
economies.
148
 The significant role played by internationally-traded goods and services in their 
economies severely limits the actual effectiveness of a nationally-tailored monetary policy 
and supports the decision to choose a fixed exchange rate regime.  
 Fixing their currencies to the euro while remaining outside it, these countries would 
effectively assume the cost of EMU membership without benefiting from the elimination of 
transaction costs. To the extent that participation in monetary union precludes future 
devaluations, stronger credibility of the fixed exchange rate is a second benefit which these 
countries will miss out on by remaining outside the EMU. As such, it may be argued that 
these countries may be better-off in EMU than outside of it. Of the four, Estonia and Bulgaria 
are particularly well-positioned to benefit from membership considering their intense trade 
relations with the EMU-16 members.  
 The conclusion that the Baltic States and Bulgaria would be better-off as full EMU 
participants is not to suggest that threats do not exist. The relatively low degree of business 
cycle correlation between Bulgaria and the EMU-16, in particular, suggests ECB monetary 
policy may not be well-configured to economic conditions there. The below-average degree 
of business cycle correlation between Estonia and the EMU-16 compared with current 
members, meanwhile, suggests that as an EMU member Estonia still faces a risk of 
asymmetric shocks. However, both the Baltic States and Bulgaria have been without 
nationally-tailored monetary policy for some years and, as such, EMU-accession should not 
represent any additional cost.  
                                                 
146
 Estonia operated a currency board arrangement until 31 December 2010. As all data has been used up until 
that date, the analysis in the case of Estonia is backward-looking and compares its suitability for EMU 
participation with the other CEECs. 
147
 The Impossible Trinity principle was used in chapter one to demonstrate the incompatibility of a fixed 
exchange rate regime and monetary policy autonomy in an environment of high capital mobility. 
148
 International trade accounts for between 99% and 140% of GDP in the four.  
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Although monetary policy autonomy has already been relinquished in these countries, 
policymakers still have the scope to ensure the threat of economic imbalances arising through 
unemployment, inflation or an unsustainable balance of payments are minimised. Three 
policy recommendations are of particular importance.  
 Firstly, it is vital that structural reforms are implemented as soon as possible to 
enhance the flexibility of the labour market and ensure unemployment does not bear the brunt 
of economic disturbances. Labour legislation and the tax and social welfare systems must be 
configured so as to ensure overall labour market flexibility. In particular, downward wage 
and price rigidities should be minimised. This should be done as soon as possible regardless 
of EMU accession as fixed exchange regimes in these countries have already removed the 
nominal exchange rate as an adjustment instrument.  
Secondly, prudent fiscal policies which guarantee the sustainability of the government 
finances and which counteract economic overheating must be ensured. The Baltic States and 
Bulgaria enjoy relatively light debt burdens compared to other European countries. It is of 
vital importance that current deficits in some are contained so as to ensure this continues. 
Sovereign debt crises in the EMU underline the importance of prudent fiscal policy in 
monetary union. Estonia‟s exceptionally prudent fiscal position serves as an example not only 
for other CEECs preparing for EMU membership, but also for other eurozone countries 
generally. 
Finally, steps must be taken to guarantee tight financial market supervision so as to 
ensure an expected fall in interest rates as a result of euro adoption does not lead to economic 
overheating. The bursting of asset price bubbles which have afflicted the Irish and Spanish 
economies demonstrate the real threat to a country‟s financial stability when financial 
regulators and fiscal authorities fail to act to dampen economic overheating.  
Of course, these three policy recommendations are also relevant for the remaining 
CEECs which face the future prospect of EMU membership. For Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania it is of vital importance that these policy 
recommendations are acted upon prior to euro adoption in order to minimise the costs 
associated with EMU participation.  
Considering their degree of business cycle correlation and intense trade links with the 
euro area alone, the Czech Republic and Hungary would be considered the best candidates 
for EMU membership of the CEECs studied. Evidence from the study of business cycle 
correlations with the euro area found that the Czech and Hungarian business cycles were the 
most correlated of the CEECs with the euro area. Although their degree of correlation 
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exceeded that of Portugal and Greece, it fell short of the EMU-16 average, indicating that 
despite progress towards convergence with the euro area business cycle, the risk that 
monetary policy could be ill-configured to their economic conditions remains. Considering 
this finding, cautious advice would be to recommend that the Czech Republic and Hungary 
wait until the observed trend of increasing business cycle convergence reaches the levels 
observed in the euro area core. 
One serious caveat to Hungary‟s potential EMU membership which cannot be ignored 
is its high level of public debt. Sovereign debt crises in the eurozone periphery emphasise the 
threat posed by unsustainable fiscal positions. Hungarian policymakers must make a 
concerted effort to reduce the public debt burden, not only to reduce the potential for 
asymmetric fiscal shocks, but also in order to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. Considering that 
government debt must not exceed 60% of GDP for EMU accession, it may be some years 
before Hungary abrogates its derogation to adopt the euro. 
Poland and Romania are the two largest CEECs considered in this research. Their 
relatively low degree of business cycle correlation with the euro area and continued use of 
nationally-tailored monetary policies indicate that accession to the EMU has the potential to 
be costly for the two economies. Their relatively low degree of openness and trade intensity 
with the euro area indicate that they do not stand to benefit as much as some smaller trade-
dependent CEECs from euro adoption. On balance, it can be concluded that at this time the 
threat of costs from participation in EMU outweighs the likely benefits for Poland and 
Romania. Both would be well-advised to wait for a higher degree of business cycle 
correlation with the EMU core before committing to euro adoption. 
Finally, Croatia‟s reasonably high degree of business cycle correlation with the euro 
area relative to the other CEECs may be somewhat surprising considering that it has not yet 
become an EU Member State. Although its current degree of trade intensity with the euro 
area is relatively low, this should be expected to increase when Croatia becomes a member of 
the European Single Market. Assuming the general trend of business cycle convergence 
continues, Croatia should be well-positioned to benefit from EMU accession after its two 
years‟ participation in ERM-II.149 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
149
 After two years‟ participation in ERM-II, 2015 is the earliest that Croatia can feasibly join the EMU. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to evaluate the economic rationale of EMU 
membership for nine CEECs. Currently, seven are legally obliged to fulfil the Maastricht 
criteria and adopt the euro. The ECB expects Croatia to face the same obligation when it 
joins the EU in 2013. Although Estonia adopted the euro on January 2011, it was also 
included as the data used in the research pre-date its EMU accession. Findings in Estonia‟s 
case will therefore constitute a retrospective analysis of the justification for joining the euro. 
 This research is important because an understanding of the economic rationale for 
euro adoption is essential if potential economic costs associated with it are to be minimised. 
CEEC policymakers retain the freedom to control the pace of progress towards EMU. An 
understanding of the economic rationale for EMU membership should be influential in 
formulating policy decisions to ensure the appropriate timing in progress towards EMU 
accession. Economic difficulties and sovereign debt crises which have afflicted a number of 
eurozone countries in recent years are testament to the fact that economic rationale has not 
played enough of a role in the official procedures for euro adoption. This further underscores 
the need to justify EMU participation for the CEECSs on economic grounds if similar costs 
are to be avoided. 
 To achieve the aim of the dissertation, analysis of the economic rationale of EMU 
membership for the CEECs was grounded in the theory of optimum currency areas. A cost-
benefit analytical framework was adopted whereby the CEECs were analysed according to a 
number of OCA properties identified in the literature. While similarity of shocks and policy 
responses to shocks indicate the extent to which participation in monetary union may be 
costly, three other OCA properties were identified which would diminish this cost: price and 
wage flexibility, mobility of factors of production and fiscal integration. On the benefit side, 
openness to trade, especially with other EMU members, and the potential for credibility gains 
were identified as determinants of the potential benefits of EMU membership. 
 An examination of the evidence from the empirical literature found generally positive 
conclusions that EMU membership is likely to bestow considerable net gains on the CEECs 
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in the long-term. A common feature of the studies reviewed was the use of at least one 
peripheral eurozone country as a benchmark against which to gauge the suitability of EMU 
membership. However, the assumption that that CEECs are suitable candidates for EMU 
based on their relative performance to the euro area periphery in terms of the OCA properties 
has been invalidated. Since these studies were conducted, economic difficulties and sovereign 
debt crises in some peripheral countries have highlighted the need for a more stringent 
assessment of the economic rationale for euro adoption. Weak evidence of the endogenous 
effect of EMU membership on the OCA properties has further emphasised that the economic 
rationale for euro adoption must be justified prior to accession. Overall, these findings call for 
a more stringent assessment of the suitability of EMU membership for the CEECs if potential 
costs are to be mitigated. 
 Evidence of the limited scope of alternative adjustment mechanisms to facilitate 
adjustment to shocks in the CEECs led to a focusing of attention on the similarity of shocks 
and policy responses to shocks as the key determinant of the likely costs to arise from 
participation in EMU. This OCA property has been widely operationalised in the empirical 
literature by examining the degree of business cycle correlation between the CEECs and the 
euro area. For the purpose of this study, it was decided to employ the de-trending approach to 
measuring business cycles. The main finding of the business cycle correlation tests was that 
CEEC business cycles have made considerable progress converging euro area in recent years. 
Despite this observation, however, CEEC business cycles still appear to be less correlated 
with the EMU-16 aggregate than most countries currently participating in the eurozone.  
On the benefit side of the analysis, attention focused on the degree of trade intensity 
between the CEECs and the euro area. The Czech and Hungarian economies were found to 
have an extremely high degree of trade intensity with the euro area which indicates that they 
are especially well-positioned to benefit from the elimination of transaction costs. The 
remaining CEECs were found to have a lower degree of trade intensity with the euro area 
than the average EMU-16 participant.  
 Overall, it was concluded that EMU accession would not represent any additional cost 
for Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania. By fixing their currencies to the euro, these countries have 
effectively forgone the ability to conduct nationally-tailored monetary policies as 
demonstrated by the Impossible Trinity principle. Remaining outside the EMU means these 
countries would incur the costs of a fixed exchange rate without benefiting from the potential 
elimination of transaction costs. Nor would they gain the added credibility derived from the 
preclusion of future exchange rate devaluations. Unfixing their currencies to operate a 
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flexible exchange rate regime makes little sense at this stage considering that the small, open 
nature of their economies would restrict the effectiveness of a nationally-tailored monetary 
policy. On balance, therefore, it can be concluded that Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania should 
proceed with efforts to fulfil the Maastricht criteria and adopt the euro.    
 Based on its degree of business cycle correlation and trade intensity with the euro 
area, the Czech Republic is the best CEEC candidate studied for participation in the EMU. 
Although it is extremely well-positioned to gain from the elimination of transaction costs, a 
significant but shrinking threat remains that asymmetric shocks could generate economic 
imbalances in its economy as an EMU participant. If the observed trend of business cycle 
convergence with the euro area continues, the ECB‟s monetary policy should soon be well-
configured to Czech economic conditions. Once closer convergence is achieved, the Czech 
Republic will be well-positioned to realise a net gain from participation in the eurozone. 
 Based on its degree of business cycle correlation and trade intensity with the euro 
area, Hungary also appears well-positioned among the CEECs to benefit from EMU 
membership. However, one major caveat to this is its extremely high government debt. 
Considering the effects of sovereign debt crises in the euro area periphery, Hungary would be 
well-advised to substantially reduce its debt before proceeding with euro adoption. 
Considering it currently exceeds the Maastricht Treaty government debt limit by 20%, it may 
be some time before Hungary will be in a position to adopt the euro. 
 Poland and Romania are the two largest CEECs included in this analysis and as such 
their ability to benefit from nationally-tailored monetary policy is higher than in smaller, 
more open CEECs. Their average or low degree of trade intensity and their low degree of 
business cycle correlation with the euro compared to other European countries suggest that 
the threat of costs posed by EMU membership currently outweigh the potential benefits. Both 
countries should wait for a higher degree of business cycle convergence with the euro area 
before proceeding with euro adoption. 
 Although Croatia cannot technically join the euro until 2015, it already ranks 
favourably among the CEECs with regards suitability for euro adoption. Assuming that 
accession to the European Single Market will have the effect of increasing trade intensity 
with the eurozone and that its business cycle continues to converge with that of the euro area, 
Croatia should be well-positioned to benefit from EMU membership when the time comes.  
 Finally, participation in EMU should be expected to produce no additional costs for 
Estonia. Elimination of transaction costs with other eurozone countries should facilitate 
deeper trade relations. Additionally, to the extent that membership of the euro precludes any 
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future devaluations, EMU membership should provide added exchange rate certainty which 
should facilitate long-term inward investment. In the long-run, the EMU participation should 
boost overall economic growth in Estonia through heightened competition and greater 
microeconomic efficiency. 
Three key policy recommendations can be made to Estonia and the remaining CEECs 
in order to minimise the potential costs associated with EMU membership. Firstly, labour 
legislation and the taxes and benefits systems should be reformed so as to increase labour 
market flexibility. Evidence from the literature suggests that labour markets in the CEECs 
(and in the EMU) are not flexible enough to facilitate adjustment to asymmetric shocks. 
Structural reforms in these areas will be imperative to ensure that unemployment does not 
bear the brunt of asymmetric shocks. Secondly, prudent and flexible fiscal policies must be in 
place to ensure the sustainability of the public finances and be prepared to react to threats of 
overheating in the economy. Sovereign debt crises in the EMU in particular underline the 
need to ensure sustainability of public finances in the absence of a fiscal transfer mechanism. 
Finally, strict financial market supervision must be enforced to ensure the stability of the 
financial sector. Regulators must be prepared for the threat that increased private sector 
lending as a result of an anticipated reduction in interest rates could lead to asset price 
bubbles and destabilise the wider economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Anderson, J. and Van Wincoop, E., 2003. Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border 
Puzzle. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 8079. 
Anderson, R., 2007. Turmoil Adds to Latvia‟s Vulnerability. The Financial Times, [online] 
24 October. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7afd4e80-81bd-11dc-9b6f-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1TQnk0h63> [Accessed 17 February 2011].  
Artis, M.J., 1991. One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and 
Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union. Open Economies Review, 2 (3), 
pp.315-21. 
--------------, 2003. Reflections on the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) Criteria in the Light of 
EMU. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 8 (4), pp.297-307. 
Artis, M.J., Fidrmuc, J. and Scharler, J., 2008. The Transmission of Business Cycles: 
Implications for EMU Enlargement. Economics of Transition, 16 (3), pp.559-82.  
Artis, M.J., Marcellino, M. and Proietti, T., 2004. Characterising the Business Cycle for 
Accession Countries. Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 4457. 
Babecky, J., 2008. Aggregate Wage Flexibility in the New EU Member States. AUCO Czech 
Economic Review, 2 (2), pp.123-45. 
Baldwin, R., 1989. The Growth Effects of 1992. Economic Policy, 4 (9), pp.247-81.  
----------------, 2006. The Euro‟s Trade Effects. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 
594. 
Baldwin, R. and Taglioni, D., 2004. Positive OCA Criteria: Microfoundations for the Rose 
Effect. Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), mimeo. 
Baldwin, R. and Wyplosz, C., 2009. The Economics of European Integration. 3
rd
 ed. 
Maidenhead: McGraw Hill.  
Barro, R., and Gordon, D., 1983. Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary 
Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12 (1), pp.101–121. 
Bayoumi, T. and Eichengreen, B., 1993. Shocking Aspects of European Monetary 
Integration. In: F. Torres and F. Giavazzi, eds. 1993. Adjustment and Growth in the 
European Monetary Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.7. 
--------------------------------------------------, 1999. Operationalising the Theory of Optimum 
Currency Areas. In: R. Baldwin, D. Cohen and A. Venables, eds. 1999. Market 
Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy. London: CEPR. Ch.7. 
78 
 
Ben Arfa, N., 2009. Analysis of Shocks Affecting Europe: EMU and Some Central and 
Eastern Acceding Countries. Panoeconomicus, 56 (1), pp.21-38.  
Benczúr, P. and Rátfai, A., 2010. Economic Fluctuations in Central and Eastern Europe: 
The Facts. Applied Economics, 42 (25), pp.3279-92.  
Blanchard, O.J. and Quah, D., 1989. The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and 
Supply Disturbances. American Economic Review, 79 (4), pp.655-73.  
Blanchflower, D.G and Oswald, A.J., 1994. The Wage Curve. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Boone, L. and Maurel, M., 1998. Economic Convergence of the CEECs with the EU. 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 2018.  
Boreiko, D., 2003. EMU and Accession Countries: Fuzzy Cluster Analysis of Membership. 
International Journal of Finance and Economics, 8 (4), pp.309–325. 
Bofinger, P., 1994. Is Europe and Optimum Currency Area? Centre for Economic Policy 
Research Discussion Paper No. 915. 
Buiter, W.H., 1999. Optimal Currency Areas: Why Does the Exchange Rate Regime Matter? 
Scottish Economic Society Annual Lecture, (26 October 1999, Edinburgh). 
Buiter, W.H. and Grafe, C., 2002. Anchor, Float, or Abandon Ship: Exchange Rate 
Regimes for Accession Countries. Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion 
Paper No. 3184. 
Burns, A. and Mitchell, W., 1946. Measuring Business Cycles. New York: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Bun, M., and Klaassen, F., 2002. Has the Euro Increased Trade? Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Paper TI 2002-108/2 (Amsterdam).  
Canova, F., 1998. Detrending and Business Cycle Facts. Journal of Monetary Economics, 41 
(3), pp.475-512.  
Cesarano, F., 2006. The Origins of the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. History of 
Political Economy, 38 (4),  pp.711-31.  
Chintrakarn, P., 2008. Estimating the Euro Effects on Trade with Propensity Score 
Matching. Review of International Economics, 16 (1), pp.186-98. 
Christiano, L.J. and Fitzgerald, T.J., 2003. The Band Pass Filter. International Economic 
Review, 44 (2), pp.435-65. 
Clark, T.E. and Van Wincoop, E., 2001. Borders and Business Cycles. Journal of 
International Economics, 55 (1), pp.59-85.  
CNB, 2010. Analyses of the Czech Republic‟s Current Economic Alignment with the Euro 
Area. Prague: Czech National Bank. 
79 
 
Cooley, T.F. and Dwyer, M., 1998. Business Cycle Analysis without much Theory: A Look 
at Structural VARs. Journal of Econometrics, 83 (1-2), pp. 57-88.  
Corden, W., 1972. Monetary Integration. Essays in International Finance, No. 93 
(Princeton, New Jersey:  International  Finance  Section,  Princeton University).  
Darvas, Z., Rose, A. and Szapáry, G., 2005. Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle 
Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic. In: J. Frankel and C. Pissarides, eds. 
2005. NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Darvas, Z. and Szapáry, G., 2005. Business Cycle Sychronization in the Enlarged EU. 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 5179.  
----------------------------------------, 2008. Business Cycle Synchronization in the Enlarged EU. 
Open Economies Review, 19 (1), pp.1-19.  
De Grauwe, P., 2009. Economics of Monetary Union. 8
th
 ed. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
De Grauwe, P. and Mongelli, F.P., 2005. Endogeneities of Optimum Currency Areas: What 
Brings Countries Sharing a Single Currency Closer Together? European Central Bank 
Working Paper No. 468. 
De Haan, J., Inklaar, R. and Jong-A-Pin, R., 2008. Will Business Cycles in the Euro Area 
Converge? A Critical Survey of Empirical Research. Journal of Economic Surveys, 22 
(2), pp.234-73.  
Dellas, H. and Tavlas, G.S., 2009. An Optimum-Currency-Area Odyssey. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 28 (7), pp. 1117-37.  
Demopoulos, G.D. & Yannacopoulos, N.A., 2001. On the Optimality of a Currency Area of 
a Given Size. Journal of Policy Modeling, 23 (1), pp.17-24.  
Dowd, K. & Greenaway, D., 1993. Currency Competition, Network Externalities and 
Switching Costs: Towards an Alternative View of Optimum Currency Areas. The 
Economic Journal, 103 (420), pp.1180-89.  
Eichengreen, B., 1994. International Monetary Arrangements for the 21
st
 Century. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Engel, C. and Rogers, J., 1996. How Wide Is the Border? American Economic Review, 86 
(5), pp.1112–25. 
--------------------------------, 2004. European Product Market Integration after the Euro. 
Economic Policy, 19 (39), pp.347-84. 
ECB, 2008. Monthly Bulletin: 10
th
 Anniversary of the ECB. Frankfurt: European Central 
Bank. 
-------, 2010. Convergence Report May 2010. Frankfurt: European Central Bank. 
80 
 
-------, 2011. Annual Report 2010. Frankfurt: European Central Bank. 
European Commission, 1990. One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential 
Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union. European Economy, 
No. 44, October.  
--------------------------------, 2011. EU Closes Accession Negotiations with Croatia. European 
Commission Press Releases, [online] 30 June. Available at: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/824> [Accessed 7 July 
2011]. 
Eurostat Database, 2011. Available through: 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database> 
[Accessed 23 June 2011]. 
Faruquee, J., 2004. Measuring the Trade Effects of EMU. International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper No. 04/154. 
Faust, J. and Leeper, E.M., 1997. When do Long-Run Identifying Restrictions Give 
Reliable Results? Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 15 (3), pp.345-53.  
Fidrmuc, J., 2001. The Endogeneity of Optimum Currency Area Criteria, Intraindustry 
Trade and EMU Enlargement. BOFIT Discussion Papers No.8.  
Fidrmuc, J. and Korhonen, I., 2003. Similarity of Supply and Demand Shocks Between the 
Euro Area and the CEECs. Economic Systems, 27 (3), pp.313-34.  
----------------------------------------, 2004. The Euro Goes East: Implications of the 2000–2002 
Economic Slowdown for Synchronisation of Business Cycles Between the Euro Area 
and CEECs. Comparative Economic Studies, 46 (1), pp.45-62.  
---------------------------------------, 2006. Meta-Analysis of the Business Cycle Correlation 
Between the Euro Area and the CEECs. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34 (3), 
pp.518-37.  
Fischer, S., 2001. Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Exchange Rate 
Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2), 
pp.3-24. 
Flam, H. and Nordström, H., 2003. Trade Volume Effects of the Euro: Aggregate and 
Sector Estimates. Institute for International Economic Studies (Stockholm), mimeo. 
Fleming, J.M., 1971. On Exchange Rate Unification. Economic Journal, 81 (323), pp.467–
88. 
Frankel, J., 1999. No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or at All Times. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7338.  
81 
 
---------------, 2008a. Should Eastern European Countries Join the Euro? A Review and 
Update of Trade Estimates and Consideration of Endogenous OCA Criteria. Dubrovnik 
Economic Conference, (June 2008, Dubrovnik). 
---------------, 2008b. The Estimated Effects of the Euro on Trade: Why Are They Below 
Historical Effects of Monetary Unions Among Smaller Countries? National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper No. 14542. 
Frankel, J. and Rose, A., 1998. The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria. 
The Economic Journal, 108 (449), pp.1009–1025. 
---------------------------------, 2002. An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on 
Trade and Income. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (2), pp.437-66. 
Frenkel, M. and Nickel, C., 2002. How Symmetric are the Shocks and the Shock 
Adjustment Dynamics between the Euro Area and Central and Eastern European 
Countries? International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 02/222.  
-----------------------------------------, 2005. How Symmetric are the Shocks and the Shock 
Adjustment Dynamics between the Euro Area and Central and Eastern European 
Countries? Journal of Common Market Studies, 43 (1), pp.53–74. 
Friedman, M., 1953. The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates. In: M. Friedman, ed. 1953. 
Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp.157-203. 
Ghosh, A., Gulde, A. and Wolf, H., 2000. Currency Boards: More than a Quick Fix? 
Economic Policy, 15 (31), pp.270-335. 
Giannone, D., Lenza, M. and Reichlin, L., 2009. Business Cycles in the Euro Area. 
European Central Bank Working Paper No. 1010. 
Giavazzi F. and Giovannini, A., 1989. Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The European 
Monetary System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Giavazzi, F. and Pagano, M., 1988. The Advantage of Tying One's Hands : EMS Discipline 
and Central Bank Credibility. European Economic Review, 32 (5), pp.1055-75. 
Goodhart, C.A.E., 1989. Money, Information and Uncertainty. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Habermeier, K., Kokenyne, A., Veyrune, R. and Anderson, H., 2009. Revised System for 
the Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements. International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper No. 09/211.  
HM Treasury, 2003. UK Membership of the Single Currency: An Assessment of the Five 
Economic Tests. HM Treasury CM 5776, London. 
Hodrick, R.J. and Prescott, E.C., 1997. Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical 
Investigation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29 (1), pp.1-16.  
82 
 
Horvath, J., 2003. Optimum Currency Area Theory: A Selective View. Bank of Finland 
Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) Discussion Paper No. 15/2003. 
Horvath, J. and Komárek, L., 2002. Optimum Currency Area Theory: A Framework for 
Discussion about Monetary Integration. Warwick Economic Research Papers No. 647. 
Horvath, J. and Rátfai, A., 2004. Supply and Demand Shocks in Accession Countries to the 
Economic and Monetary Union. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32 (2), pp.202-11.  
IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2011. Available through: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx> [Accessed 27 
June 2011]. 
Ingram, J.C., 1962. Regional Payments Mechanisms: The Case of Puerto Rico. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press. 
Ishiyama, Y., 1975. The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: A Survey. Staff Papers - 
International Monetary Fund, 22 (2), pp.344-83.  
Kaiser, R. and Maravall, A., 2002. A Complete Model-Based Interpretation of the Hodrick-
Prescott Filter: Spuriousness Reconsidered. Bank of Spain Working Paper No. 0208. 
Kawai, 1992. Optimum Currency Areas. In: P.  Newman, M. Milgate and J. Eatwell, eds. 
1992. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance Volume 3. London: 
MacMillan Press. Pp.78–81. 
Kenen, P.B., 1969. The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View. In: R. 
Mundell and A. Swoboda, eds. 1969. Monetary Problems of the International Economy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ch.2.  
Kenen, P.B. and Rodrik, D., 1986. Measuring and Analyzing the Effects of Short-Term 
Volatility in Real Exchange Rates. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 68 (2), pp. 
311-15.  
Korhonen, I., 2003. Some Empirical Tests on the Integration of Economic Activity between 
the Euro Area and the Accession Countries. Economics of Transition, 11 (1), pp.177-96. 
Krugman, P., 1993. Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU. In: F. Torres and F. Giavazzi, eds. 
1993. Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Ch.8. 
Kydland, F. and Prescott, E., 1977. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85 (3), pp.473–91. 
Larsson, A., Gaco, N. and Sikström, H., 2011. Monetary Integration and Business Cycle 
Synchronisation: Evidence from the Nordic Countries. Stockholm University 
Department of Economics, mimeo. 
83 
 
Lucas, R., 1976. Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique. In: K. Brunner and A.H. 
Meltzer, eds. 1976. The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets. Amsterdam: Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. Pp. 19-46. 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2002. Adopting the Euro in Hungary: Expected Benefits, Costs and 
Timing. NBH Occasional Paper No. 2002/24. 
Marsh, D., 2009. The Euro: The Politics of the New Global Currency. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
McCallum, J., 1995. National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns. The 
American Economic Review, 85 (3), pp. 615–23. 
McKinnon, R., 1963. Optimum Currency Areas. The American Economic Review, 53 (4), 
pp.717-25.  
Mikek, P., 2009. Shocks to New and Old Europe: How Symmetric? Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 47 (4), pp. 811-30.  
Mintz, N., 1970. Monetary Union and Economic Integration. The Bulletin, 64 (New York: 
New York University Press). 
Mise, E., Kim, T. and Newbold, P, 2005. On Suboptimality of the Hodrick-Prescott Filter at 
Time Series Endpoints. Journal of Macroeconomics, 27 (1), pp.53-67. 
Mongelli, F., 2002. “New” Views on the Optimum Currency Area Theory: What is EMU 
Telling Us? European Central Bank Working Paper No. 138. 
-----------------, 2005. What is European Economic and Monetary Union Telling us About the 
Properties of Optimum Currency Areas? Journal of Common Market Studies, 43 (3), 
pp.607-35.  
--------------, 2008. European Economic and Monetary Integration and the Optimum Currency 
Area Theory. European Economy, Economic Papers No. 302, February. 
Montoya, L. and De Haan, J., 2008. Regional Business Cycle Synchronization in Europe? 
International Economics and Economic Policy, 5 (1), pp.123-37. 
Mundell, R., 1961. A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. The American Economic Review, 
51 (4), pp.657-65.  
NBP, 2009. Report on Full Membership of the Republic of Poland in the Third Stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. Warsaw: National Bank of Poland. 
Obstfeld, M. and Rogoff, K., 1995. The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 9 (4), pp.73-96. 
OECD, 1999. EMU: Facts, Challenges and Policies. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
84 
 
---------, 2000. EMU One Year On. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.  
Persson, T., 2001. Currency Unions and Trade: How Large is the Treatment Effect? 
Economic Policy, 16 (33), pp.433-48. 
Poole, W., 1970. Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic 
Macro Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (2), pp.197-216.  
Rogoff, K. 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (4), pp.1169-89.  
Romer, P., 1986. Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 94 (5), pp.1002-37.  
Rose, A., 2000. One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on 
Trade. Economic Policy, 15 (30), pp.7–45.  
-----------, 2004. A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Common Currencies on International 
Trade. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 10373. 
Rose, A. and Van Wincoop, E., 2001. National Money as a Barrier to Trade: The Real Case 
for Monetary Union. The American Economic Review, 91 (2), pp.386-90. 
Savva, C., Neanidis, K. and Osborn, D., 2010. Business Cycle Synchronization of the Euro 
Area with the New and Negotiating Member Countries. International Journal of Finance 
and Economics, 15 (3), pp.288-306. 
Schadler, S., Drummond, P., Kuijs, L., Murgasova, Z. and Van Elkan, R., 2005. 
Adopting the Euro in Central Europe: Challenges of the Next Step in European 
Integration. International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 234. 
SEB, 2011. Global FX Guide. Available at: <https://taz.vv.sebank.se/cgi-
bin/pts3/mc6/mb/research.nsf/alldocsbyunid/0F4ACD83A8A44062C1257830004F525B
/$File/GlobalFXFeb2011.pdf> [Accessed 2 April 2011] 
Tavlas, G., 1993. The „New‟ Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. The World Economy, 16 
(6), pp.663-85.  
Tinbergen, J., 1962. Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International 
Economic Policy. NewYork: Twentieth Century Fund. 
Tower, E. and Willet, T., 1976. The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas and Exchange 
Rate Flexibility. Special Papers in International Finance, No. 11 (Princeton, New 
Jersey:  International  Finance  Section,  Princeton University). 
Willett, T., Permpoon, O. and Wihlborg, C., 2010. Endogenous OCA Analysis and the 
Early Euro Experience. The World Economy, 33 (7), pp.851-72.  
85 
 
Wise, P., 2011. Portugal Reaches Deal on €78bn Bail-out. The Financial Times, [online] 3 
May. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b8e251a8-75c7-11e0-82c6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1UTQc9eog> [Accessed: 2 June 2011]. 
Wyplosz, C., 1997. EMU: Why and How it Might Happen. Journal of Economic 
Prespectives, 11 (4), pp.3-22. 
------------------, 2006. European Monetary Union: The Dark Sides of a Major Success. 
Economic Policy, 21 (46), pp.207-61. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1a: EU Government Finances (2010)
150
 
Country Debt Deficit 
Austria 72.3% -4.6% 
Belgium 96.8% -4.1% 
Bulgaria 16.2% -3.2% 
Croatia
151
 40.0% -5.3% 
Cyprus 60.8% -5.3% 
Czech R. 38.5% -4.7% 
Denmark 43.6% -2.7% 
EMU-16
152
 73.9% -7.3% 
Estonia 6.6% 0.1% 
Finland 48.4% -2.5% 
France 81.7% -7.0% 
Germany 83.2% -3.3% 
Greece 142.8% -10.5% 
Hungary 80.2% -4.2% 
Ireland 96.2% -32.4% 
Italy 119.0% -4.6% 
Latvia 44.7% -7.7% 
Lithuania 38.2% -7.1% 
Luxembourg 18.4% -1.7% 
Malta 68.0% -3.6% 
Netherlands 62.7% -5.4% 
Poland 55.0% -7.9% 
Portugal 93.0% -9.1% 
Romania 30.8% -6.4% 
Slovakia 41.0% -7.9% 
Slovenia 38.0% -5.6% 
Spain 60.1% -9.2% 
Sweden 39.8% 0.0% 
United Kingdom 80.0% -10.4% 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150
 Source: Eurostat Database 
151
 Data for Croatia is an estimate from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. 
152
 Unweighted average of EMU-16 countries. 
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Appendix 2a: Business Cycle Correlation: Hodrick-Prescott de-trended coefficients 
Country Pre-Crisis: 
1995Q1 - 
2008Q1 
Full Period: 
1995Q1 - 
2010Q4 
Sub-period 1: 
1995Q1 - 
2004Q1 
Sub-period 2: 
2004Q2 - 
2010Q4 
Austria 0.8989 0.9232 0.8018 0.9712 
Belgium 0.8731 0.9108 0.8604 0.9683 
Bulgaria 0.4268 0.5381 0.1017 0.7627 
Croatia 0.8144 0.8003 0.3861 0.8804 
Cyprus 0.8121 0.7580 0.7878 0.7734 
Czech R. 0.7450 0.8057 0.3505 0.9400 
Denmark 0.7765 0.8459 0.6637 0.9096 
EMU-16
153
 0.8140 0.8272 0.6367 0.8959 
Estonia 0.6129 0.7463 0.0060 0.9363 
Finland 0.8870 0.9201 0.7405 0.9673 
France 0.9408 0.9461 0.9393 0.9801 
Germany 0.9596 0.9602 0.9301 0.9721 
Greece 0.6385 0.4482 -0.0332 0.5362 
Hungary 0.6827 0.8035 0.5361 0.8854 
Ireland 0.8427 0.8613 0.7184 0.9051 
Italy 0.9286 0.9474 0.8479 0.9805 
Latvia 0.7094 0.7953 0.1497 0.9399 
Lithuania 0.3974 0.6182 -0.4843 0.9218 
Luxembourg 0.7825 0.8118 0.6992 0.9205 
Malta 0.5812 0.6739 0.5166 0.7405 
Netherlands 0.9270 0.9264 0.8969 0.9484 
Poland 0.5594 0.5784 0.3443 0.8480 
Portugal 0.7568 0.7911 0.7134 0.9118 
Romania 0.7924 0.7092 0.7816 0.7355 
Slovakia 0.4890 0.6253 -0.3336 0.8904 
Slovenia 0.7529 0.8122 0.2071 0.9412 
Spain 0.9527 0.9186 0.8952 0.9273 
Sweden 0.8638 0.8696 0.7425 0.9048 
United Kingdom 0.8840 0.9186 0.7524 0.9693 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153
 Unweighted average of coefficients of EMU-16 countries. 
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Appendix 2b: Business Cycle Correlation: Christiano-Fitzgerald de-trended coefficients 
Country Pre-Crisis: 
1995Q1 - 
2008Q1 
Full Period: 
1995Q1 - 
2010Q4 
Sub-period 1: 
1995Q1 - 
2004Q1 
Sub-period 2: 
2004Q2 - 
2010Q4 
Austria 0.9299 0.9525 0.8658 0.9832 
Belgium 0.8930 0.9270 0.8800 0.9812 
Bulgaria 0.4408 0.6078 0.0553 0.7665 
Croatia 0.8222 0.8320 0.3832 0.8973 
Cyprus 0.8541 0.8146 0.8563 0.8251 
Czech R. 0.8214 0.8757 0.6588 0.9815 
Denmark 0.8839 0.9243 0.8197 0.9589 
EMU-16
154
 0.8484 0.8656 0.6636 0.9166 
Estonia 0.7538 0.8433 0.3361 0.9779 
Finland 0.9257 0.9444 0.8465 0.9739 
France 0.9526 0.9584 0.9482 0.9864 
Germany 0.9778 0.9767 0.9546 0.9863 
Greece 0.4374 0.2686 -0.8450 0.4015 
Hungary 0.8198 0.8860 0.6877 0.9517 
Ireland 0.9574 0.9531 0.9232 0.9674 
Italy 0.9645 0.9739 0.9172 0.9936 
Latvia 0.8916 0.9226 0.6878 0.9834 
Lithuania 0.5306 0.7205 -0.2351 0.9386 
Luxembourg 0.8893 0.9203 0.8291 0.9749 
Malta 0.6572 0.7805 0.6610 0.8156 
Netherlands 0.9758 0.9751 0.9679 0.9786 
Poland 0.6199 0.7203 0.4745 0.8919 
Portugal 0.8757 0.9061 0.7639 0.9824 
Romania 0.6472 0.6649 0.5288 0.6995 
Slovakia 0.4871 0.6849 -0.4146 0.9191 
Slovenia 0.8249 0.8678 0.5292 0.9465 
Spain 0.9717 0.9457 0.9339 0.9494 
Sweden 0.9113 0.9186 0.8221 0.9455 
United Kingdom 0.9387 0.9576 0.8570 0.9887 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
154
 Unweighted average of coefficients of EMU-16 countries. 
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Appendix 2c: Contemporaneous and lagged correlation with euro area: HP filter  
Country Contemporaneous 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags 
Czech R. 0.8057 0.7159 0.5532 0.3832 
Hungary 0.8035 0.7342 0.5459 0.3311 
Croatia 0.8003 0.6643 0.4749 0.2809 
Latvia 0.7953 0.7107 0.5672 0.3973 
Estonia 0.7463 0.7094 0.579 0.4203 
Romania 0.7092 0.4942 0.2202 -0.0152 
Lithuania 0.6182 0.4763 0.2984 0.1163 
Poland 0.5784 0.5917 0.4394 0.2795 
Bulgaria 0.5381 0.3343 0.1287 -0.0066 
 
 
 
Appendix 2d: Contemporaneous and lagged correlation with euro area: CF filter 
Country Contemporaneous 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags 
Czech R. 0.8757 0.7862 0.5942 0.3667 
Hungary 0.8860 0.8185 0.6640 0.4725 
Croatia 0.8320 0.6677 0.4155 0.1297 
Latvia 0.9226 0.8302 0.6519 0.4243 
Estonia 0.8433 0.8069 0.6751 0.4891 
Romania 0.6649 0.4230 0.0953 -0.2235 
Lithuania 0.7205 0.5680 0.3399 0.0905 
Poland 0.7203 0.6794 0.5124 0.2928 
Bulgaria 0.6078 0.3772 0.1095 -0.1351 
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Appendix 3a: Openness in CEECs and Euro Area 
Country 2008 2009 2010 3-year 
Average 
Austria 113% 97% 106% 105% 
Belgium 171% 143% 160% 158% 
Bulgaria 137% 104% 117% 119% 
Cyprus 102% 86% 87% 91% 
Czech R. 150% 133% 154% 145% 
EMU-16
155
 124% 109% 119% 117% 
Estonia 147% 123% 150% 140% 
Finland 90% 73% 79% 81% 
France 56% 48% 53% 53% 
Germany 89% 77% 87% 84% 
Greece 60% 48% 50% 53% 
Hungary 163% 150% 166% 159% 
Ireland 158% 167% 186% 170% 
Italy 58% 48% 55% 54% 
Latvia 99% 89% 108% 99% 
Lithuania 132% 111% 139% 127% 
Luxembourg 324% 302% 318% 315% 
Malta 173% 155% 169% 166% 
Netherlands 144% 131% 148% 141% 
Poland 84% 79% 84% 82% 
Portugal 75% 63% 69% 69% 
Romania 74% 68% 77% 73% 
Slovakia 169% 142% 163% 158% 
Slovenia 138% 115% 127% 127% 
Spain 59% 49% 55% 54% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155
 Unweighted average of EMU-16 countries. 
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Appendix 3b: Trade Intensity with the Euro Area 
Country 2008 2009 2010 3-year 
Average 
Austria 52% 44% 51% 49% 
Belgium 106% 89% 96% 97% 
Bulgaria 45% 35% 40% 40% 
Cyprus 36% 30% 32% 33% 
Czech R. 81% 73% 85% 79% 
Denmark 28% 24% 25% 26% 
EMU-16
156
 47% 39% 44% 43% 
Estonia 44% 36% 42% 41% 
Finland 24% 18% 20% 21% 
France 26% 22% 24% 24% 
Germany 32% 27% 30% 30% 
Greece 16% 13% 13% 14% 
Hungary 73% 64% 72% 70% 
Ireland 31% 33% 36% 33% 
Italy 21% 18% 20% 20% 
Latvia 23% 18% 23% 21% 
Lithuania 30% 25% 32% 29% 
Luxembourg 78% 61% 64% 67% 
Malta 73% 60% 64% 65% 
Netherlands 67% 57% 66% 63% 
Poland 39% 38% 40% 39% 
Portugal 37% 33% 34% 35% 
Romania 30% 29% 34% 31% 
Slovakia 61% 52% 63% 59% 
Slovenia 67% 54% 64% 62% 
Spain 24% 19% 22% 22% 
Sweden 32% 27% 28% 29% 
United Kingdom 21% 19% 20% 20% 
 
 
                                                 
156
 Unweighted average of EMU-16 countries. 
